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Abstract
There is little research exploring the links between positive psychotic phenomena such
as persecutory delusions and PTSD. Despite similarities in symptomatology and
similarities in the cognitive models of both disorders, few researchers have addressed
the question of what factors influence outcome (PTSD or persecutory delusions)
following traumatic life events. There is some evidence to suggest PTSD can develop
as a result of the experience of psychosis and conversely, some research suggests
psychotic symptoms can sometimes occur following traumatic life events. This study
explores the role of attributional style and the search for meaning following traumatic
life events as a central mechanism in the development of both PTSD and persecutory
delusions. A postal survey design was used to assess PTSD and delusional
symptomatology in emergency ambulance workers. Participants completed a battery
of questionnaires designed to measure PTSD and delusional symptomatology as well
as measures of specific and general attributional style. A measure of post-traumatic
beliefs was also included.
The final sample comprised 51 emergency ambulance workers and their responses
suggested that the likely rate of PTSD among this sample was 51 percent. The results
suggested that in this sample, a self-blaming attributional style was associated with
delusional symptomatology and that length of time spent in the emergency ambulance
service may be associated with higher rates of PTSD symptomatology. Furthermore,
those who met caseness for PTSD may hold delusional beliefs with more conviction
and preoccupation as well as finding these beliefs more distressing than those who
display less symptomatology. In keeping with the literature on PTSD, it was also
discovered that self-blame and negative beliefs about oneself in relation to the cause of
the traumatic event seem to predict PTSD symptomatology.
The discussion of these findings considers: the relationship between PTSD and
delusional symptomatology, implications for clinical practice, implications the
emergency ambulance service, and directions for future research.
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Introduction
There is currently a great deal of debate about the similarities between the symptoms
of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the symptoms of psychosis. Much of
this discussion is focused on the potential direction of causality, fuelled by a number of
studies (Meuser, Trumbetta, Rosenberg, Vidaver, Goodman, Osher, & Auciello, 1998)
demonstrating that there are high levels of life-time trauma in the histories of patients
with psychosis and other severe mental health disorders, and the similarities in
symptom profile between PTSD and psychosis (Fowler, 1997; McGorry, 1991;
Shanner & Eth, 1989; Stampfer, 1990). Another relatively small body of literature has
shown that PTSD is present in patients with a primary diagnosis of psychosis and that
the experience of becoming psychotic may in itself be sufficient to produce PTSD in
some individuals (Lundy, 1992; McGorry, 1991, 1995; Shaner & Eth, 1989; Shaw et
al., 1997; Williams-Keeler et al., 1994).
However, there appears to be very little literature that addresses the question of what
mediates symptom presentation (in particular PTSD or psychosis) following a
traumatic life event. Many individuals will experience the symptoms of PTSD
following a traumatic life event and then over the following weeks or months recover
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995). However, others go on to develop chronic PTSD symptoms.
Some individuals present with symptoms that fit with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a
psychotic disorder. It is in this context that this investigation explores some cognitive
factors common to both disorders in an attempt to gain further insight into the way in
which individuals process traumatic experiences and how outcome, adjustment and
symptomatology is determined. The role of causal attributions and beliefs developed in
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an attempt to create meaning following traumatic events is examined as a potential
factor for the development of positive psychotic symptoms and PTSD. Clinical and
research implications are also discussed.
Defining Terms
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
The psychopathology of trauma is currently conceptualised clinically in terms of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The diagnostic criteria for PTSD are defined by
the American Psychiatric Associations' Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM). This suggests that PTSD may develop following an event by which
the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of self or others. In addition, where the person's response involved
perceptions of intense fear, helplessness or horror (APA, DSM-IV, 1994).
The PTSD syndrome includes recurrent and persistent symptoms relating to: (i) the re-
experiencing of the event (e.g. intrusive thoughts and images, re-enactment, dreams);
(ii) avoidance of related stimuli (e.g. memories, thoughts, feelings, activities,
situations) or numbing of general responsiveness (e.g. diminished interest, constricted
affect, estrangement, detachment); and (iii) increased arousal (e.g. sleep/ concentration
difficulties, irritability, hypervigilance, startle response). See Appendices 1 and 2 for
DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria.
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While the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in the general population has been estimated to
be eight to nine percent (Breslau, Davis, Adreslci & Peterson, 1991), it is important to
recognise that PTSD is a common reaction to trauma and that most people will
experience some of these symptoms in the immediate aftermath of the traumatic life
event. A sizeable proportion of individuals will recover in the following weeks or
months, but in a significant sub-group the symptoms persist, often for years (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000; Rothbaum, Foa, Rigs, Murdock, & Walsh, 1992).
Psychosis
Psychotic disturbance refers to the presence of delusions, hallucinations, or marked
thought disorder (Shaw, McFarlane & Booldess, 1997). These disturbances are
present in a range of psychiatric disorders listed in DSM-IV and are categorised as
'Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders' (see Appendix 3 for DSM-IV diagnostic
criteria for these disorders).
Although traditionally these symptoms have been associated with the `schizophrenias'
(i.e. schizophrenia and schizophreniform disorder), psychotic symptoms can occur in
discrete episodes (e.g. brief psychotic disorder, DSM-IV) and may occur concurrently
with major mood disorders (e.g. schizoaffective disorder, DSM-IV) (see Appendix 3
for DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for these disorders).
It is also common that a range of disorders or syndromes may manifest during the early
stages of a psychotic episode and this has been termed 'diagnostic flux' (McGorry,
1997).
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Many attempts have been made to increase the reliability of diagnosing schizophrenia
by means of standardised psychiatric assessments e.g., Research Diagnostic Criteria
(Spitzer, Endicott and Robbins, 1978); the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994); and the
Present State Examination (PSE; Wing, Cooper and Sartorius, 1974). All have
increased the reliability of classification, but there have been no successful attempts at
independently validating schizophrenia (Bentall, 1990).
The notion of different psychotic symptoms belonging to a discrete syndrome is clearly
flawed, as psychotic phenomena appear in other diagnostic groups, and research
suggests that the tendency to hallucinate and bizarre (delusional) thinking appears to
be spread across the population at large (Claridge, 1990).
The recent shift towards a cognitive, symptom-focused approach to psychosis
(Chadwick, Birchwood, & Trower, 1996) has highlighted the arbitrary nature of
placing disorders such as schizophrenic, affective and other forms (eg. drug-induced)
of psychosis in discrete diagnostic categories.
It is common for researchers to classify the symptoms of psychosis into two groups.
Negative symptoms include: poverty of speech, attentional impairment, apathy and
anhedonia. It is generally agreed that positive symptoms include: auditory
hallucinations, somatic passivity, thought insertion, thought withdrawal and thought
broadcast. Delusional perception (a normal perception that is perceived as having
special, highly personal significance) and delusions that the person's actions, impulses
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or feelings are being imposed or controlled by an external agent are also considered to
be positive symptoms. Persecutory delusions also fall into this category (Bentall,
1990).
Delusions
Defining delusions is difficult. Traditionally, they were viewed in terms of qualitative
differences between delusions and other beliefs. Jaspers (1963) argued that abnormal
beliefs, in general, are held with extraordinary conviction, have bizarre or impossible
content and are impervious to counter-argument or the impact of experience. More
recently, Berrios (1991) suggests that delusions are not beliefs at all but, "empty
speech acts, whose informational content refers to neither the world or self They are
not the symbolic expression of anything" (p.12).
However, traditional methods of defining delusions have been challenged by a call to
define delusions (and hallucinations) as points on a continuum with normality. A
person's position on this continuum is influenced by dimensions of thought and
behaviour, such as degree of belief conviction and the extent of preoccupation with the
belief (Strauss, 1969) and how much distress the belief causes the individual (Garety
and Hemsley, 1994). In addition, delusions have also been shown to vary in terms of
resistance to modification, interference with social functioning and pervasiveness
(Garety and Hemsley, 1994). As opposed to minimising individual differences and
commonality with other beliefs, this perspective embraces them and elevates them to
the position of defining characteristics.
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Further evidence for the dimensional or continuum view is that when psychometric
testing of psychosis-proneness in non-psychotic individuals was undertaken, it was
discovered that individuals scoring highly on such measures resemble psychotic
individuals on a number of experimental correlates (Peters, Joseph, & Garety,1999).
Furthermore, delusions tend to concern certain themes (particularly themes of
persecution or grandiosity, which pertain to the person's position in the social
universe) which suggests that, contrary to Berrios (1991), these kinds of beliefs do
have meaning (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). Specifically, Bentall et al. (1994)
suggest that the apparent intentionality (meaningfulness) of delusional beliefs means
that it might be profitable to investigate content-specific information processing biases
in deluded patients.
Bentall et al. (1994) have suggested that paranoid delusions are the result of cognitive
abnormalities in relation to over-attention to threat-related stimuli, an explanatory bias
towards attributing negative outcomes to external causes and biases in information
processing relating to the self-concept.
Cognitive approaches to the study of delusions have provided us with some
information regarding the mental processes exhibited by people who hold delusional
ideas. Garety & Hemsley (1994) have demonstrated that people experiencing
delusions exhibit overconfidence in their judgements, make rapid decisions, jump to
conclusions and tend to focus on current stimuli.
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Continuum model
The advantage of a continuum model in explaining psychotic phenomena is that it
allows for the inclusion of those experiencing bizarre ideas or vivid visual perceptions
into mainstream society. Categorical definitions of these experiences could be seen to
essentially exclude, pathologise and marginalise individuals. Those who report these
types of experiences can be seen as distinctly different, rather than similar in many
ways. It may be a lot easier and more comfortable to our sense of mental well-being to
point out the differences between ourselves and those who may act in a strange or
unusual way. The work of Bentall et al. (1991), Romme and Escher (1989), and
Kingdon and Turlcington (1993) has advanced the issue of psychological phenomena
lying on a continuum with normality.
The notion has also been supported by Strauss (1989) who states: "Considerable
evidence indicates that over periods of improvement, (patients') symptoms may fade
slowly through intermediate levels of experience. Hallucinations may be more and
more dimly perceived until they disappear entirely. Delusions can gradually lose their
power and cease to exist" (p.27). Strauss, although refraining from dismissing the
concept of schizophrenia altogether as others have done, does suggest that it might be
more adequately described as, "a point or series of points on a functional continuum"
(p. 585). He continues:
"Schizophrenia and the symptoms that characterise it are understandable exaggerations
of normal function and not exotic symptoms superimposed on the personality. When
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the distortions or exaggeration of certain psychological functions reach a certain level
of eccentricity or begin to impair social function they are called symptoms." (p. 585)
Figure 1. Vulnerability-stress interaction (after Zubin & Spring, 1977).
Vulnerability-stress interaction
Although psychotic symptoms can be related to normal behaviour, it is necessary to
consider why some individuals exhibit psychotic symptoms and go on to be diagnosed
as suffering from a schizophrenic illness. Over the last 20 years it has become widely
accepted that the important factors here are the interaction between the individuals'
inherent vulnerability and the events or circumstances that they find themselves
experiencing. Zubin and Spring (1997) developed the concept of vulnerability-stress
diathesis (i.e., predisposition). Their hypothesis is summarised by Figure 1. They
suggest that:
"as long as the stress induced by challenging events stays below the threshold of
vulnerability, the individual.., remains well within the limits of normality. When the
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stress exceeds the threshold, the person is likely to develop a psychopathological
episode of some sort.., when the stress abates and sinks below the vulnerability
threshold, the episode ends"(p.110).
It follows then that it is possible for anyone to experience symptoms that fall
somewhere along the psychotic spectrum, as several studies have shown. Alcohol
withdrawal and other organic confusional states like those produced by severe
infections and drugs including amphetamines, LSD and cocaine have been observed to
induce hallucinations, delusions and thought disorder indistinguishable from those
observed in psychotic disorders (Kingdon and Turkington, 1993).
Furthermore, there is clinical evidence which demonstrates that psychotic symptoms
can also occur in situations where there is no organic basis, such as sleep deprivation
(Oswald, 1974), solitary confinement (Grassian, 1983) and sensory deprivation
(Vernon, 1963). Such symptoms have been observed in six medical students who had
no psychiatric histories after being deprived of sleep for 108 hours. After considering
the results of this experiment Oswald (1974) concluded that, "the irrational thinking of
sleep-deprived persons... .resembles that of certain mental illnesses, notably paranoid
schizophrenia" (p. 59).
Further support for the continuum approach can be taken from a study by Bentall and
Slade (1985) who reported that 17 percent of undergraduate students said that they
had often heard their thoughts being spoken aloud (which is generally considered a
diagnostic symptom of schizophrenia).
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Research has also shown that it is quite common for people to hold bizarre, unusual or
unscientific beliefs. A Gallup poll (Cox and Cowling, 1989) which involved interviews
with 60,000 British adults revealed that 68 percent of those interviewed believed in
God, over 50 percent thought that thought transference between two people was
possible, over 50 percent thought it possible to predict something that was going to
happen before it did, and over 25 percent believed in ghosts.
U.S. research (Gallup and Newport, 1991) has also demonstrated that 25 percent of a
non-psychiatric sample believe in telepathic experiences, 25 percent believe in ghosts,
10 percent believe that they have talked to the devil and 14 percent believe that they
have seen an unidentified flying object (UFO).
It would therefore be reasonable to approach the study of psychotic symptoms with
the assumption that most people under sufficiently stressful circumstances can
experience these phenomena. Furthermore, the continuum approach to symptoms
allows us to approach this subject with an awareness of social context.
Symptom overlap in P7'SD & Psychosis
The study of possible links between PTSD and psychosis is not a simple one due to the
similarity of their symptoms. Just as the symptoms of psychosis can be categorised as
either positive or negative clusters, so can those of PTSD (McGorry, 1991). Some of
the negative symptoms of PTSD, such as emotional numbing, affective constriction,
estrangement from others, difficulty concentrating, feelings of de-realisation,
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detachment and general neglect overlap significantly with negative symptoms of
psychosis (Fowler, 1997; McGorry, 1991; Shanner & Eth, 1989; Stampfer, 1990).
In terms of positive symptoms, there is a close similarity between the hallucinations
and delusions associated with psychosis and the intrusive thoughts, images and
'flashback' experiences considered the hallmark symptoms of PTSD (Calhoun and
Resick, 1993; Ehlers and Stein, 1995; Foa, Steketee and Rothbaum, 1989). These
'flashbacks' or intrusive recollections often take the form of auditory, visual, tactile,
and/or olfactory hallucinations and are often accompanied by paranoia (Allen and
Coyne, 1995; Butler, Meuser, Sprock and Br4 1996; Heins, Gray, & Tennant, 1990;
Romme and Escher, 1989; Sansonnet-Hayden, Haley, Marriage, & Fine, 1987; Shaner
and Eth, 1989). Other shared positive symptoms include increased levels of arousal
and hypervigilance (Starnfer, 1990). In addition the disturbed sleep patterns and post-
traumatic nightmares of PTSD may appear as the interrupted sleep often seen in
psychosis (Kinzie and Boehnlein, 1989). Furthermore, both PTSD and psychosis
constitute an assault on the self-esteem of the individual which has been cited as
contributing to the high suicide rates seen in both conditions (Williams-Keeler,
Milliken, and Jones, 1994).
The similarity between the two disorders is potentially problematic as PTSD may be
misdiagnosed (Butler et al., 1996; Van Der Hart, Wiztum & Friedman, 1993) or
unrecognised (Meuser et al., 1998), and therefore inappropriate treatment may be
given such as antipsychotic medication (Marmar, Foy, Kagan and Pynoos, 1994).
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The relationship between these two disorders continues to fuel controversy and the
association between the two disorders has been conceptualised in a variety of ways.
However there are two approaches which seem to have attracted significant support:
1. The experience of a psychotic episode may lead to the development of PTSD.
2. Psychosis may develop as a reaction to traumatic life events and represents one
possible outcome amongst a range of trauma-related disorders including PTSD.
The relationship between trauma and psychosis: FTSD as a reaction to psychosis
This perspective holds that PTSD and psychosis are essentially different disorders. In
addition it suggests that the state of acute psychosis and/or the resultant hospitalisation
in a psychiatric setting may in itself be sufficient to trigger the development of PTSD
(Lundy, 1992; McGorry, et al., 1991, 1995; Shaner & Eth, 1989; Shaw et al.,1997;
Williams-Keeler et al., 1994).
Furthermore a substantial minority (44 percent) of patients has been demonstrated to
display levels of PTSD symptoms that indicate clinical caseness in relation to the
experience of compulsory or voluntary detention in a psychiatric setting (Morrison,
Bowe, Larkin & Nothard, 1999).
PTSD may occur in the wake of a range of extreme stressors (APA, 1980, 1987),
including severe physical illness (Kutz, Garb, & David, 1988). Before DSM IV (APA,
1994) revised the diagnostic criteria, the experience of acute psychosis and its
contemporary management usually satisfied criterion A in the DSM-III (APA, 1980)
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and DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) operational definitions of PTSD, in that it is outside the
range of usual human experience and would be markedly distressing to almost anyone.
However, the limited research into the prevalence of PTSD after acute psychosis and
its relationship to other sequelae of psychotic disorders perhaps reflects the general
difficulty in identifying cases of PTSD (Kolb, 1989; Singh, 1986), which in turn arises
from the nature of the psychopathology.
The relationship between PTSD and psychosis: Psychosis as a reaction to trauma
There is much speculation about the relationship between traumatic life events and the
development of psychosis; particularly the association between childhood sexual abuse
(CSA), physical abuse, or interpersonal violence. Surveys have indicated that between
34 percent and 53 percent of patients with severe mental illness report childhood
sexual or physical abuse (Greenfield, Strakowsld, Tohen, Bateson, & Kolbrener,
1994). Also, estimates of lifetime exposure to interpersonal violence for people with a
severe mental illness vary between 48 percent and 81 percent (Hutchings & Dutton,
1993; Jacobson & Richardson, 1987).
Other studies report higher rates of psychotic disorders in groups of individuals with
PTSD compared with the general population (Kinzie & Boelihein, 1989), and suggest
that positive PTSD symptoms may evolve beyond 'flashback' experiences, to become
unrelated to the initial trauma (Butler et al., 1996).
As referred to earlier, psychotic symptoms have been observed in the aftermath of a
range of traumatic life events. Grimby (1983) demonstrated that 82 percent of elderly
13
participants in his study experienced either auditory or visual hallucinations one
month after bereavement and, therefore, this could be considered a normal reaction.
It is not uncommon for rape victims and victims of sexual abuse to experience auditory
hallucinations, often hearing the voice of the attacker/perpetrator (Morrison, 1998).
Furthermore, it is common for victims of sexual abuse to experience flash backs,
intrusive images and bodily flashbacks associated with the abuse often years after the
event (Heins, Gray, & Tennant, 1990; Sansonnet-Hayden, Haley, Marriage, & Fine,
1987).
Somatic delusions such as Delusional Parasiosis (the belief that one is infested with
parasites such as mites, lice, insects or bacteria, often in or under the skin but
sometimes internally or around bodily orifices) are also documented following
traumatic life events such as rape and sexual assault (Musalek, Bach, Passweg, and
Jeager, 1990; Oruc & Bell, 1995).
Furthermore, Beck and van der Kolk (1987) studied chronically hospitalised psychotic
women and found that patients reporting histories of childhood incest were more likely
to have sexual delusions.
Further evidence that massive trauma can lead to psychotic states can be found by
looking at the work of those who studied concentration camp survivors. Eitenger
(1964, 1967) in his later work studied survivors in Norway and Israel and found that a
core group of patients, particularly those in Israel, clearly met the schizophrenia
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criteria of that time which he believed was directly related to the trauma they had
experienced in the concentration camps. Klein, Zellermayer, & Shanan (1963)
described psychosis among some Nazi concentration camp victims. Beebe (1975),
describing a long-term follow-up of Pacific Theater prisoners of World War II, found a
marked increase in schizophrenia in those who had the most severe trauma, probably
attributable to the relatively more severe trauma these prisoners endured in the
Japanese camps.
Kinzie and Boehnlein (1989), in a study of Cambodian refugees who suffered massive
trauma as a consequence of the Pol Pot regime, concluded, "Clearly, the symptoms of
PTSD and psychosis can coexist and each follow an independent course"(p.195). They
go on to say that anti-psychotic drug therapy generally helped the more overt
symptoms of psychosis but did not change the PTSD symptoms. Finally, they suggest
that a small but definite group of people with massive trauma have schizophrenia-like
symptoms which are associated with that trauma.
Meuser, Trumbetta, Rosenberg, Vidaver, Goodman, Osher, & Auciello (1998), in a
study of lifetime trauma history in a mixed sample of inpatients and outpatients with
severe mental illness', found that the rate of PTSD in this group was 43 percent.
Considering the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in the general population has been
estimated to be 8-9 percent (Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes,
& Nelson, 1995), studies by Cascardi, Meuser, DeGirolomo, & Murrin (1996), Craine,
1 Severe mental illness was defined as, "a psychiatric illness resulting in significant impairment in ability to care for oneself work or
meet other role obligations...". All participants had a primary diagnosis (DSM-IV, APA, 1994) other than substance abuse or
dependence.
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Henson, Colliver, & MacLean (1998) and Meuser et al. (1998) suggest that patients
with severe mental illness are at increased risk for having PTSD. These studies are
consistent in that they all report high levels of exposure to traumatic life events over
the lifetime compared to the general population. Meuser et al. (1998) found that 98
percent of their sample reported exposure to at least one traumatic event over their
lives, compared with rates of 39-56 percent of lifetime exposure to trauma in the
general population (Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995) using a similar definition
for 'traumatic event'. Therefore, it appears that PTSD is a common comorbid disorder
for patients with severe mental illness.
Finally, Meuser et al. (1998), found that the number of traumas experienced was
predictive of PTSD and this is consistent with studies in the general population (Astin,
Ogland-Hand, Coleman, & Foy, 1995; King, King, Foy & Gudanowslci, 1996; Resnick
& Kilpatrick, 1994.)
Theoretical explanations for the links between PTSD and psychosis are sparse, but
Allen et al. (1995) suggest that trauma-induced dissociation and dissociative
detachment render individuals vulnerable to psychotic experience. They argue that
dissociative detachment undermines the individual's grounding in the outer world,
thereby hampering reality-testing and rendering the individual with post-traumatic
symptoms, "vulnerable to the nightmarish inner world" (p.332). They develop their
formulation by suggesting that severe dissociative detachment renders individuals
vulnerable to psychosis because it also robs them of internal anchors - the sense of
being connected to one's body, a sense of self or identity, and one's own actions. The
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result may not only be impaired reality-testing but also severe confusion,
disorganisation and disorientation.
The aetiology of psychosis has been debated extensively, and opinion again can be
roughly divided into two arenas; the first, primarily endogenous, governed by
biological factors and characterised by a predominance of negative symptoms; and the
second, a largely trauma-induced aetiology, characterised by a predominance of
positive symptoms (Ellason & Ross, 1997; Ross, Anderson, & Clark 1994; Ross &
Joshi, 1992; Van Der Hart, Witzum, & Freidman, 1993).
Cognitive models of PTSD and Psychosis
The similarity between cognitive models of positive psychotic symptoms and cognitive
models of PTSD is compatible with the notion that some psychotic symptoms may be
trauma induced. In Ehlers & Clark's (2000) cognitive model of persistent PTSD, it is
suggested that a key feature of persistent PTSD is that individuals who do not recover
naturally are characterised by idiosyncratic negative appraisals of the traumatic event
and/ or its sequelae, that have the common effect of creating a sense of serious current
threat. This threat can either be external (e.g., the world is a dangerous place, people
are dangerous) or internal (e.g., a threat to one's view of oneself as a capable/
acceptable person who will be able to achieve life's important goals). The sense of
current threat that is maintained by these negative appraisals is accompanied by
intrusions, arousal and strong emotions such as anxiety, anger, shame or sadness.
These negative appraisals also prompt a series of dysfunctional cognitive and
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behavioural responses that have the short term aim of reducing distress, but have the
long-term effect of preventing cognitive change and therefore maintain the disorder.
This explanation is supported by several cognitive models of PTSD that suggest
avoidance/emotional numbing or negative symptoms may be used as a defence against
the distress caused by intrusive phenomena and therefore creates a short-term
reduction in distress (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; McFarlane, 1992; Spurrell & McFarlane,
1995). However, this strategy is ultimately counter-productive as avoidance is thought
to play a key role in maintaining intrusions (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).
Similarly, cognitive models of psychosis suggest that positive symptoms such as
auditory hallucinations are similar to the intrusions of PTSD, in that they are essentially
undesirable cognitive phenomena which, due to their inconsistency with the person's
belief system are attributed to an external source in order to reduce the distress in the
short-term (Morrison et al., 1995). The distress associated with these externally
attributed intrusive thoughts/perceptions is suggested to lead to a variety of
maladaptive responses, including avoidance, which in turn maintain the potency of the
intrusions (Morrison, 1998).
Cognitive models of persecutory delusions have also highlighted the importance of
needing to create meaning for negative events (Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994).
Research has demonstrated that individuals who have discrepancies between their
actual view of themselves and their ideal self will, on experiencing a negative life-
event, attribute that event to an external source in order to avoid activation of this
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latent discrepancy (self-blame and potential subsequent depression) (Lyon et al. 1994;
Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). Again this form of avoidance reduces distress in
the short-term but ultimately leads to persecutory ideation (Lyon et al. 1994; Bentall,
Kinderman & Kaney, 1994).
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated experimentally that paranoid individuals make
external (other-blaming) attributions for negative events on explicit measures of
attributional style, but on implicit (non-obvious) measures, which presumably do not
activate self-discrepancies, make internal (self-blaming) attributions for negative events
(Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994).
Also, it has been demonstrated experimentally that paranoid patients preferentially
recall negative trait words as well as threat-related words (Bentall, Kaney, & Bowen-
Jones, 1995). Two studies have demonstrated that war veterans with PTSD and rape
victims with PTSD also selectively attend to threat-related stimuli, whereas control
groups who have experienced similar traumatic experiences, but without PTSD, do not
(Foa, Feslcy, McCarthy and Kozak, 1990; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, and Zeitlin,
1990). It would seem therefore that attributional style is important in both psychosis
and PTSD.
Attributional style, trauma and outcome
Making sense of the event, finding a 'general purpose or pattern of meaning' in it, is a
critical task of the individual confronted with serious illness or injury (Moos and Tsu,
1977). Disease, accidents, and criminal victimisation may severely violate an
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individual's customary self-view or world-view and pose a serious threat to the
individual's "assumptive world" (Epstien, 1973; Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Janoff-Bulman
& Lang-Gunn, 1988).
Furthermore, attributions seem to be more readily created for negative events because
it is these that individuals want to affect in terms of outcome (Briclunan et al., 1980;
cited in Janoff-Bulman & Lang-Gunn, 1988). In fact the only attribution that seems to
be consistently ruled out by those searching for meaning in the aftermath of a negative
event is that of chance alone, because it entails a view of life outcomes as randomly
distributed and of one's world as being arbitrary and indiscriminate (Janoff-Bulman &
Lang-Gunn, 1998).
Janoff-Bulman (1979) suggested that there are two distinct types of self-blame, one
representing an adaptive response, the other a maladaptive one. Behavioural self-blame
consists of blaming one's own behaviours for the occurrence of negative outcomes and
thus enables the individual to re-establish a sense of invulnerability and perceived
control. In contrast, characterological self-blame consists of blaming one's own
character or enduring qualities for the occurrence of negative outcomes and this not
only precludes a sense of invulnerability and control but is associated with harsh self-
criticism, low self-esteem and perceptions of helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, and
Teasdale, 1978).
If one looks at these attributional styles in terms of the taxonomic scheme developed
by Abramson et al. (1978) in their reformulation of learned helplessness, behavioural
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self-blame is an internal, unstable, specific attribution, whereas characterological self-
blame is an internal, stable and global attribution. After Abramson et al. (1978)
Kinderman & Bentall (1996) developed a more sophisticated method of assessing
causal locus (the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire
(IPSAQ)) and concluded that internal attributions for negative events may be
associated with depressive reactions, personal-external (blaming another person or
persons) attributions for negative events with paranoid ideation, while situational
(blaming external circumstances or chance) attributions appear to be psychologically
benign.
There is some evidence that causal attributions are related to the development of
PTSD (see Joseph, Brewin, Yule, and Williams, 1993 for a review). Individuals with
PTSD tend to attribute the trauma to more internal causes (self-blame) than
traumatised individuals without PTSD (Ehlers and Steil, 1995). There is also evidence
that general attributional style is correlated with PTSD in that individuals with PTSD
show more externality for positive outcomes (Ehlers & Stein, 1995).
Wenninger and Ehlers (1998), found that highly symptomatic survivors of CSA
attributed negative events to more internal, global and stable (characterological self-
blame) causes than mildly symptomatic survivors. Similarly, in a prospective study of
individuals involved in road traffic accidents, participants who met criteria for PTSD
were more likely to attribute negative events to internal causes than participants who
did not develop PTSD (Winter & Ehlers, in preperation; cited in Ehlers & Stein,
1995).
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Attributional style appears to be a key variable in determining outcome of trauma
related illness and type/ severity of symptoms (Janoff-Bulman. 1985). It has also been
cited as central to cognitive explanations of both auditory hallucinations and
persecutory delusions (Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994; Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier,
1995).
This divergence in outcome captures the essence of this investigation, which examines
some of the factors that may influence whether an individual develops PTSD or
psychotic symptoms following a traumatic event. (This question is diagramatically
represented in Figure 2. Below)
Cognitive models of PTSD and the positive symptoms of psychosis do appear to share
a central tenet, that is, the need to create meaning for negative life-events.
Attributional style appears key in both of these areas, in that there is a need to attribute
responsibility for negative life events. One can potentially blame oneself others or the
situation. In doing so individuals who experience these disorders demonstrate a form
of avoidance which leads to a distorted appraisal of events. In PTSD, research
suggests that this avoidance takes the form of thought suppression or physically
avoiding situations which might remind one of the event. In paranoid delusions and
auditory hallucinations, it seems that this avoidance takes the form of blaming others
or placing distressing cognitive phenomena outside one's own self In the long-term,
both produce a sense of persistent threat which is confounded by resultant symptoms
such as anxiety and fear which are ultimately maintained by avoidance.
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Figure 2. Trauma and potential outcome.
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Aims & Hypotheses
Aims
The purpose of this investigation is to explore some of the cognitive factors which
influence outcome in traumatised individuals and to investigate variance in symptom
presentation. This is attempted by addressing the following aims:
(i) To obtain an estimate of the rate of PTSD in a UK sample of emergency ambulance
personnel.
(ii) To explore the role of attributional style and blame in relation to symptom
presentation and outcome in traumatised individuals.
Hypotheses
In response to such aims it is hypothesised that:
1. There will be a higher rate of delusional symptomatology in the high-score trauma
group than the low-score trauma group.
2. Internal attributions for the traumatic event and a general internal attributional style
will be associated with PTSD-type symptomatology.
3. External attributions for the traumatic event and a general external attributional
style will be associated with delusional symptomatology.
4. Self-blame, negative cognitions about the self and negative cognitions about the
world in relation to the cause of the traumatic event will be associated with PTSD
symptomatology.
5. Negative cognitions about the world will be associated with delusional
symptomatology.
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Methodology
Design
The study used a survey method to gather data from the participants and a
correlational design.
The Participants
Recruitment
Participants were recruited from the Greater Manchester Ambulance Service
(GMAS). The general manager of the service was contacted and expressed a
willingness to be involved in terms of accessing the population under consideration.
Selection criteria
The only selection criterion applied to participants was that they must currently be
working as either an ambulance technician or a paramedic for the GMAS.
Participation was voluntary and consent was obtained by means of a covering letter
(see Appendix 4) which stated that filling in the questionnaires and returning them was
to be regarded as consent. Participants were assured that any information provided
would be treated as confidential and that their anonymity would be protected.
The Target Sample
All 570 GMAS emergency ambulance staff met the above criteria and were contacted
as potential participants. They were sent written information about the study with the
questionnaires, and contact numbers were provided to ensure that support and advice
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was available. After one month a reminder letter was sent to all GMAS emergency
staff (see Appendix 4.).
Final Sample
The total sample comprised 51 participants and this represented a 9 percent response
rate. Although more questionnaires were returned, these were incomplete or spoiled.
There were 43 (84.3 percent) male respondents, seven (13.7 percent) female
respondents and one respondent who did not specify gender. Of these 29 (56.9
percent) were paramedics and 21 (41.2 percent) were ambulance technicians, again
one participant did not record job title. The length of time served in the service was an
average of 194 months (6 months to 384 months). Age of participants ranged from 22
to 56 years of age the mean being 40.
The Measures
The number of tests included was considered the maximum that could reasonably be
expected to be filled in and returned without putting off potential participants, and the
minimum necessary to provide the information required by the author to address the
aims and hypotheses in question.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PTSD was assessed as a continuous as well as a dichotomous phenomenon.
The 17-item Davidson Trauma Scale (DTS) (Davidson, 1996) was used both as a
continuous and dichotomous measure of the frequency and severity of PTSD
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symptoms (with five-item intrusion, seven-item avoidance/numbing, and five-item
hyperarousal subscales), and rate of PTSD c caseness' (according to DSM-IV criteria).
As the DTS asks respondents to: 'Please identify the trauma that is most disturbing to
you', it is completed without reference to a pre-specified traumatic event. However,
the covering letter and instructions provided with the questionnaires explained that the
questionnaires related to experiences whilst working for GMAS. It also allowed the
investigation of the rate and chronicity of PTSD `caseness' regardless of causal event
(see Appendix 5).
Participants rated each DTS item for symptom frequency and severity using a five
point scale rated from zero to four, to give a total score range of zero to 136. Higher
scores indicate a greater impact of the traumatic event on health and psychological
well-being.
The DTS was developed from a large U.S. sample of adults exposed to early sexual
abuse, adult rape, combat and hurricane trauma (Davidson, 1996). As relevant to this
study, the DTS has been demonstrated to have good divergent validity with personality
measures of extroversion-introversion (Davidson, 1996) and good convergent validity,
yielding a correlation of .64 with the Impact of Events Scale (IFS, Horowitz, Wilner &
Alvarez, 1979) (Davidson, Book, Colket, Tupler, Roth, David, Hertzberg, Mellman,
Beckham, Smith, Davidson, Katz & Feldman, 1997). It has high test-retest and internal
reliability (Davidson, 1996) and the ability to detect treatment effects amongst female
psychiatric patients with a history of childhood sexual abuse (Zlotnick, Davidson, Shea
& Pearlstein, 1996). Investigations with the aforementioned mixed sample of trauma
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survivors suggested a cut-off score of 40 as providing optimal diagnostic accuracy (83
per cent correctly classified as case/non-case) (Davidson, 1996; Davidson et al., 1997).
The Trauma Questionnaire
The Trauma Questionnaire (TQ) (Larkin, 1999) is a six item questionnaire which uses
The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ)
(Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), as a template. The respondent is asked to identify and
state the trauma most disturbing to them and to state when it occurred. The
respondent is asked to rate the cause of the trauma on a 0-100 visual analogue scale, in
terms of whether it happened because of: a) something about you, b) something about
another person (or group of people), (c) something about the situation (circumstances
or chance). The respondent is required to rate the same trauma on these dimensions
first as they think about it in the present and second as they felt about it at the time of
the trauma (see Appendix 6).
The Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (P7CI)
The 36-item PTCI (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin and Orsillo, 1999) is a measure of trauma
related thoughts and beliefs, with items derived from clinical observations and current
theories of post-trauma psychopathology (see Appendix 7). The items load on three
factors: Negative Cognitions about Self; Negative Cognitions about the World; and
Self Blame. These factors have been shown to have excellent internal consistency and
good test-retest reliability; to correlate moderately to strongly with measures of PTSD
severity, depression and general anxiety; and to discriminate well between traumatised
individuals with and without PTSD (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin and Orsillo, 1999). The
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PCTI compares well with other measures of trauma related cognitions, especially in its
superior ability to discriminate traumatised individuals with and without PTSD.
Attributional Style
The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ)
The IPSAQ ( Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) provides a method of assessing causal locus
(causal locus refers to the way in which we decide upon the reason or cause of an
event) (see Appendix 8). Research has indicated that causal locus may be implicated in
severe psychiatric disorders (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995), particularly paranoia
(B entail, Kinderman and ICaney, 1994) and has pointed to the potential utility of
taxonomies of causal locus. For positive and negative events two measures of
internality are derived from responses on the 32 item questionnaire, a measure of self-
blame and a measure of the extent to which external attributions implicate other
persons as opposed to situations. In a group of non-psychiatric subjects the IPSAQ
sub-scales were found to be adequately reliable (Bentall & Kindennan, 1996). Self-
blame was significantly associated with internality scores on the Attributional Style
Questionnaire (ASQ) (Peterson, Semmel, Von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalslcy and
Seligman, 1982) and with depressed mood. Scores representing the proportion of
personal as opposed to situational external attributions were significantly associated
with an analogue measure of paranoia (Bentall & Kinderman, 1996).
Delusional Ideation
The 40-item Peters Delusion Inventory (PD!) (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999) is
designed to measure delusional ideation in the normal population, using the Present
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State Examination (Wing, Cooper, and Sartorius, 1974) as a template. The
multidimensionality of delusions is incorporated by assessing measures of distress,
preoccupation and conviction (see Appendix 9). Individual items are endorsed by one
in four adults on average. This scale has good internal consistency and its concurrent
validity was confirmed by percentages of common variance with three scales
measuring stereotypy, magical ideation and delusions. PDI scores have been shown to
remain constant up to one year later, demonstrating good test re-test reliability (Peters
et al., 1999).
Items 'Suspiciousness', 'Persecution', and 'Paranoia' were found to form individual
factors within a factor analysis on the PDI (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). By
summing the scores for questions four, six and nine the Suspiciousness variable was
created, similarly for Persecution scores for questions eight, 11, 12, 13 and 14 were
grouped and for Paranoia, questions seven and 23 were summed. This allowed the
present study to focus on these areas during the statistical testing of the relevant
hypotheses.
The Procedure
The recruitment procedure has already been described under the 'The Participants'
section. As stated, participation was voluntary and confidential.
After providing the general manager of GMAS with a copy of the ethical proposal for
this study and obtaining consent to access the target population, arrangements were
made for distribution of the questionnaires. This was achieved by arranging for the
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payroll department of GMAS to attach a plain A4 envelope containing the
questionnaires, a covering letter from the author, supporting letter from the general
manager (see Appendix 4) and a free-post envelope (addressed to the author at the
clinical psychology training course) to the pay slips of all 570 emergency ambulance
staff. The covering letter by the author made it clear that participation was entirely
voluntary, anonymous and strictly confidential, as well as being independent of GMAS.
After a period of one month a reminder letter was attached again to the pay-slips of the
target sample (see Appendix 4). No further participants volunteered 4id consequently
no additional questionnaires were returned.
Ethical Approval
Ethical approval was sought and obtained from the University of Wales research ethics
committee. As stated above permission to recruit and assess participants for the study
was also sought and obtained from the general manager of GMAS.
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Results
Descriptive information outlining the characteristics of the sample is given in Table 1.
Table 1.	 Descriptive information about participants
N
Valid
N
Missing
Mean Standard
Deviation
Range
Age (Years) 50 1 40.38 8.80 22-56
Gender
•	 Males
•	 Females
43 (84.3%)
7	 (13.7%)
1 (2%)
Job Title
•	 Paramedic
•	 Technician
29 (56.9%)
21(41.2%)
1 (2%)
Time in Service
(Months)
50 1
191.78 97.51 6-384
Time Since
Identified Trauma
(Months) 40 11 67.77 80.92 1-240
Tablela.
N N Score Score Mean Max Min
Valid Missing <40 >40 (SD) Score Score
PTSD Caseness 45 6 22 23 51.88 128 0
& Total Score (49%) (51%) (35.70)
Table! b.
N
Valid
N
Missing
Mean
(SD)
Max
Score
Min
Score
PDI Total Score 46 5 13.08
(10.34)
40 0
Tablelc.
N
Valid
N
Missing
Median Mean
(SD)
Max
Score
Min
Score
PTCI Total Score 45 6 101.00 103.60
(35.58)
175 35
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Data Screening
Data were screened for approximation to a normal distribution (skewness and kurtosis
were calculated by dividing the statistic skewness or kurtosis by the standard error
(skewness or kurtosis) and regarded as acceptable if that figure was within the range of
+2 to -2). Statistical transformations were carried out on the following variables: Time
(since trauma) , PD! Conviction, Distress, Freqeuncy (preoccupation), lPSAQ Neg-int,
Neg-sit, Pos-sit and PTCI Self-blame (see Appendix 10 for summary table). All
transformed variables were squared apart from Time which was transformed using a
Log transformation.
Reliability analysis was also completed (Cronbach's Alpha) for the data yielded by the
questionnaires used in this study. All were found to be reliable and within acceptable
parameters (above 0.7) apart from the Trauma Questionnaire (see Appendix 11).
Inter-item correlations were also used as a guide to assessing reliability (scores
between .2 and .4 were regarded as ideal) and the IPSAQ and TQ were both
questionable in this area (see Appendix 11).
Analysis of descriptive data
A series of correlational analyses was carried out to investigate potential relationships
between age of participants, length of time spent in job (Job Time) and time since
identified trauma (Time) with PDI total and sub-scales (Preoccupation, Distress &
Conviction), DTS total and sub-scales (Intrusions, Avoidance, Arousal, Frequency &
Severity), as well as all six IPSAQ sub-scales (Negative internal, personal, situational
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and Positive internal, personal and situational attributions) and PTCI total and sub-
scales (negative cognitions about the self; negative cognitions about the world and self-
blame). A summary of the significant correlations are presented in Table 2. The
correlation matrix for the whole analysis is presented in Appendix 12.
A number of independent-sample t-tests were also conducted to establish any
differences between the responses of technicians and paramedics (Job Type) and males
or females (Gender), on the questionnaires described above (see Appendix 13).
Table 2. Summary of significant results from correlational analysis of descriptive data.
DTS
TOTAL
DTS
INTRU
DTS
AVOID
DTS
AROUS
DTS
FREQ
DTS
SEV
IPSAQ
POSPERS
IPSAQ
NEG1NTt
Pearson
correlation
Age
.300 .315 --- .321 --- --- -.358 --
Jobtime .391
.392 .341 .352 .295 .295 --- .320
Timet--
— --- ---
.403 .367 --- ---
Sig(2-tailed)
Age
.045 .035 — .031 -- -- .018 ---
Jobtime
.008 .008 .022 .018 .049 .049 --- .039
Tithe—
— -- — .006 .013 --- ---
N
Age 45 45 — 45 --- --- 43 ---
Jobtime 45 45 45 45 45 45 --- 42
Timet .._ _
--- --- 45 45 --- ---
Key: DTS= Davidson Trauma Scale, DTSArous= Arousal sub-scale, DTSAvoid = Avoidance sub-
scale, DTSIntru= Intrusions sub-scale, DTS Sev= Severity subscale & DTS Freq= Frequency sub-
scale.
IPSAQ= Internal Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, POSPERS= positive personal
attributions, NEG1N1'= negative internal attributions.
t=Transformed variable.
This analysis revealed that 'Job Time' and 'Age' was significantly associated with DTS
Total score, Intrusion, Avoidance and Arousal sub-scales. This suggests that level of
trauma-related symptoms increase in relation to the length of time spent in the job and
age of participants.
To investigate this finding further, a partial correlation was performed correlating Age
and DTS Total controlling for Job Time. This analysis revealed that there was no
significant relationship between Age and PTSD symptoms once Job Time is controlled
for (r=.0357, n=42, p=.818).
A second partial correlation was performed correlating Job Time with DTS total,
controlling for Age. This analysis revealed that relationship between Job Time and
DTS Total did not remain significant when controlling for Age (r=.2562, n=42,
p=.082).
Conducting partial correlations where the independent variable (e.g. Age) is so highly
related (r=.734, n=50, p=.000) to the control variable (e.g. Job Time) by definition
reduces the power of the association.
However the size of the partial correlation is clearly greater between Job Time and
DTS Total compared with the partial correlation between Age and DTS Total (whilst
controlling for Age and Job Time respectively).
This suggest that while neither Age or Job Time affect level of trauma while
controlling for the other, nonetheless Job Time may be the more important factor in
terms of PTSD symptoms.
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This speculation is reinforced by the finding that negative internal attributions are
significantly associated with length of time spent in the job, as are frequency and
severity of PTSD symptoms, whilst the age of participants is unrelated to these
variables. This suggests that the longer one spends in the ambulance service, the more
one is likely to have a self-blaming attributional style for negative events and more
frequent and severe PTSD symptoms.
Furthermore, the t-tests conducted indicate that the ambulance technicians who
responded score higher on PTCI self-blame items than do paramedics (t (42)=1.74, p=
0.02), and that males also score higher than females on this item paramedics (t
(42)=1.74, p= 0.02), (see Appendix 13).
Analysis of Hypothesis I
There will be a higher incidence of delusional symptomatology in the high-score (caseness) trauma
group than in the low-score (not caseness) trauma group.
To investigate this hypothesis, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
performed using `caseness' (those scoring above 40 and below 40 on the DTS) as the
grouping factor and Total and subscales from the PDI relating to conviction, distress,
and preoccupation of delusions as the dependent variables. This analysis revealed a
non-significant multivariate effect (Wilk's Lambda was 0.78, F(4,36)= 2.41, p= 0.067).
This statistic refers to the combination of dependent variables inputted into the
MANOVA, and does not describe the relationship between caseness and the individual
dependent variables.
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As this study is of an exploratory nature, follow-up univariate F-tests were completed
and revealed significant group differences for the PD! sub-scales; 'distress'
(F(1,39)=7.28, p=0.010) 'conviction' (F(1,39)=6.00, p=0.019) and ' preocupation'
(F(1,39)-6.56, p=0.014). See Table 3. for summary.
Table 3. Univariate F-tests for PD! Total and Sub-scales using caseness as grouping
factor.
Variable Not-Caseness
Mean (SD)
Caseness (>40)
Mean (SD)
F Sig. Of F
PDITOTAL 10.85 (11.71) 16.15 (9.32) 2.54 0.119
PD!
Convictiont
4.49 (2.65) 6.58 (2.80) 6.00 0.019
PD! Distresst 3.96 (2.52) 6.30 (3.00) 7.28 0.010
PD!
Preoccupation
3.98 (2.52)
t.
6.06 (2.60) 6.56 0.014
t=Transformed vanable.
To investigate this hypothesis more specifically, a MANOVA was carried out using
caseness as the grouping factor and the factors from the PDI that specifically related to
paranoid delusions (paranoia, persecution and suspiciousness) as dependent variables.
This revealed no overall multivariate effect (Wilk's lambda was 0.92, F(3,40)=1.11,
nor did any of the univariate F tests within it reach significance (see Table 4).
Therefore, although the hypothesis is not supported overall, significant differences on
the PDI subscales indicate that those scoring above caseness on the DTS hold their
delusional beliefs with greater levels of conviction, distress and preoccupation than
those who score below the cut-off for caseness on the DTS.
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Table 4. Summary of univariate F-tests relating to paranoia items with DTS caseness
as grouping factor.
Variable Not-Caseness
Mean (SD)
Caseness (>40)
Mean (SD)
F Sig. Of F
_
PDI Paranoia 1.45 (1.33) 1.59 (1.36) 0.11 0.74
PD!
Persecution
1.50 (1.68) 2.31 (1.91) 2.26 0.13
PD!
Suspiciousness
1.40 (1.18) 1.90 (1.10) 2.09 0.15
Analysis of Hypothesis ll
Internal attributions for the traumatic event and a general internal attributional style for negative
events will be associated with PTSD symptomatologv
To investigate specific attributional style in relation to the identified traumatic event, a
non-parametric correlational analysis (Spearman's rho) was performed because the
Trauma Questionnaire (TQ) subscales could not be normalised using transformations.
DTS Total and subscales (Intrusions, Avoidance and Arousal) were correlated with
TQ question IA (internal attributions for the cause of the traumatic event at the time
of the trauma) and TQ question 2A (internal attributions for the cause of the traumatic
event now) and revealed no significant relationships (see Table 5).
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Table 5. Correlational analysis of DTS total and sub-scales with TQ items relating to
internal attributions for the traumatic event.
Correlations
TQ 1A TQ2A
Spearman's Correlation DTSTOTAL .017 .157
rho Coefficient DTSAROUS .068 .150
DTSAVOID
-.033 .104
DTSINTRU
-.070 .156
Sig. DTSTOTAL .912 .334
(2-tailed) DTSAROUS .666 .357
DTSAVOID .831 .524
DTSINTRU .657 .336
N DTSTOTAL 43 40
DTSAROUS 43 40
DTSAVOID 43 40
DTSINTRU 43 40
Key: DTS= Davidson Trauma Scale, DTSArous= Arousal sub-scale, DTSAvoid= Avoidance sub-
scale, DTSIntru= Intrusions sub-scale.
TQ1A= Trauma questionnaire question IA, TQ2A= Trauma questionnaire question 2A
A parametric correlational analysis was conducted using the DTS total and subscales
as above and the three negative attribution subscales of the IPSAQ. Again no
significant relationships were revealed between the DTS total and subscales and the
lPSAQ subscale (NEGINT), which loads on internal attributions for negative events
(See Table 6).
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Table 6. Correlational analysis of DTS sub-scales with IPSAQ negative sub-scales
NEGINTt NEGPERS NEGSITt
Pearson Correlation
DTSTOTAL .133 -.255 .133
DTSAROUS .049 -.205 .049
DTSAVOID .179 -.308 .179
DTSINTRU .132 -.184 .132
sig(2-tailed)
DTSTOTAL .414 .112 .414
DTSAROUS .762 .205 .762
DTSAVOID .270 .053 .270
DTSINTRU .419 .254 .419
N
DTSTOTAL 40 40 40
DTSAROUS 40 40 40
DTSAVOID 40 40 40
DTSINTRU 40 40 40
Key: DTS= Davidson Trauma Scale, DTSArous= Arousal sub-scale, DTSAvoid = Avoidance sub-
scale, DTSIntru= Intrusions sub-scale.
IPSAC, Internal Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, NEGINT= negative internal
attributions, NEGPERS= negative personal attributions, NEGSIT= negative situational attributions
t=Transformed variable.
Overall, hypothesis II was not supported by the results of these analyses.
Analysis of Hypothesis III
External attributions for the identified traumatic event and a general external attributional style for
negative events will be associated with delusional symptomatology.
To investigate specific attributional style in relation to the identified traumatic event, a
non-parametric correlational analysis (Spearman's rho) was performed because the
Trauma Questionnaire (TQ) sub-scales could not be normalised using transformations.
PD! Total and subscales; Conviction, Distress and Preoccupation were correlated with
TQ question 1B (external-personal attributions for the cause of the traumatic event at
the time of the trauma) and TQ question 2B (external-personal attributions for the
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cause of the traumatic event now), and no significant relationships emerged (see Table
7).
Table 7. Correlational analysis of PDI total and sub-scales with TQ items relating to
external attributions for the traumatic event.
Correlations
TQ1B TQ2B
Spearman's Correlabon PDITOTAL -.145 -.145
rho Coefficient pDICON -.076 .013
PDIDIST -.121 -.034
PDIFREQ -.102 -.023
Sig. PDITOTAL .359 .367
(2-tailed) PDICON .615 .936
PDIDIST .423 .830
PDIFREQ .501 .883
PDITOTAL 42 41
PDICON 46 43
PDIDIST 46 43
PDIFREQ 46 43
Key= T17, Trauma questionnaire, PDI= Peters Delusions Inventory, TOTAL= total score, Con=
coviction, Dist= distress, FREC, preoccupation.
To investigate the relationship between general attributional style and delusional
symptomatology a parametric correlation was carried out. The three IPSAQ sub-
scales relating to negative attributional style were correlated with PDI Total and sub-
scales. The NEGPERS sub-scale from the IPSAQ represents negative-external-
personal attributional style (blaming other people or persons for negative events).
This analysis revealed that the lPSAQ subscales NEGINT and NEGPERS were
significantly associated with all the PDI sub-scales (see Table 8). Specifically, the
NEGPERS sub-scale was highly associated with all the PDI sub-scales, but in a
negative direction. That is, the more participants score on the PDI, then they are also
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less likely to have an external-personal attributional style. The hypothesis therefore is
not borne out in this case. It was interesting to note however, that there was a
significant relationship between the PDI total and sub-scales and the negative-internal
attributions sub-scale which was the opposite of what was hypothesised.
Table 8. Correlational analysis of PDI total and sub-scales with IPSAQ negative
attributional sub-scales.
Correlations
NEGPERS NEGINTSQ NEGSITSQ
Pearson	 PDITOTAL -449— .375 .087
Correlation	 PDICONSQ -.478" .433" .037
PDIDISQ -.480** .442" .008
PDIFRSQ
-455" .425" .024
Sig	 PDITOTAL .004 .019 .600
(2-tailed)	 PDICONSQ .001 .004 .815
PDIDISQ .001 .003 .959
PDIFRSQ
.002 .005 .880
N	 PDITOTAL 39 39 39
PDICONSQ 42 42 42
PDIDISQ 42 42 42
PDIFRSQ	 _ 42 42 42
... Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
.. Correlation is significant at the 005 level (2-tailed).
Key: PDI= Peters Delusions Inventory, TOTAL= total score, Consq= coviction, Distsq= distress,
Freqsq= preoccupation. IPSAI: Internal Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire,
NEGINT= negative internal attributions, NEGPERS = negative personal attributions, NEGSIT=
negative situational attributions
STransformed variable.
To investigate this hypothesis further, the specific factors relating to paranoid
delusions from the PDI (suspiciousness, paranoia, and persecution) were placed in a
correlational analysis with the EPSAQ sub-scales. As can be seen from the correlation
matrix in Table 9, the factors loading on predisposition to paranoid delusions were
again highly correlated with the IPSAQ NEGPERS sub-scale but in a negative
direction. This is contrary to the hypothesis as stated and again the NEGINT sub-scale
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is also highly associated with PDI factors relating to predisposition to paranoid
delusions which was also contrary what was predicted.
Table 9. Correlational analysis of PDI factors relating to paranoia with 1PSAQ
negative attributional sub-scales.
Correlations
NEGINTSQ NEGPERS NEGSITSQ
Pearson	 PDIPARAN .407— -.318* -.070
Correlation
	 PDIPERSC .432— -.502" -.042
PDISUSP -.036
Sig.	 PDIPARAN .008 .040 .657
(2-tailed)	 PDIPERSC .004 .001 .790
PDISUSP .003 .001 .819
N	 PDIPARAN 42 42 42
PDIPERSC 42 42 42
PDISUSP	 _ 42 42 42
". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Key: PDI= Peters Delusions Inventory, SUSP= suspicion, PARA= paranoia, PERS= persecution.
IPSAQ Internal Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, NEGINT= negative internal
attributions, NEGPERS= negative personal attributions NEGSIT= negative situational attributions
Ss:",Transformed variable.
Analysis of Hypothesis IV
Self-blame, negative cognitions about the self and negative cognitions about the world in relation to
the cause of the traumatic event will be associated with P75'D symptomatology.
To investigate this hypothesis, a linear multiple regression analysis was performed.
The dependent variable was DTS Total and the predictor variables were the PTCI sub-
scales relating to self-blame (PCTISBSQ), negative cognitions about the self
(PCTINCAS), and negative cognitions about the world (PCTINCW). A direct entry
method was used and Table 10. displays the correlations between the variables, the
unstandardised regression coefficients (B), the standardised regression coefficients (13),
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and R, R2, and adjusted R2 after entry of all three IVs. It also displays the semi-partial
correlations (sr2)2 obtained after the entry of the IV in the relevant step of the
regression equation.
Table 10. Regression analysis of DTS total (DV) and PTCI sub-scales (IVs).
(N=40) Correlations
DTS
TOTAL
PCTI
SBSQt
PCTI
NCAS
B 13 t sig. sr2
PCTISBSQt .558*** 1.57 .029 .220 .827 .04
PCTINCAS •795*** .638*** 1.28 .928 5.525 .000 .29
PCTINCW .401** .278* .668*** -.916 -.227 -1.687 .100 .02
Untransformed
DTS
TOTAL
PCTI
SBSQ
PCTI
NCAS
PCTI
NCW
Means 52.20 3.05 62.55 32.90 R2=.66
AdjustedR2=.63SD 36.54 .66 26.32 9.05
R=.81***
***significant LE .001
**significant LE .005
*significant LE .05
t= transformed variable
With all variables entered R was significantly different from zero R=.81 indicating a
highly significant association between the IVs (F(3,36) = 23.55, p<.001), accounting
for 66 percent (63 percent adjusted) of the variability in the DTS total scores. From
the correlational analysis it appears that all of the PTCI sub-scales are highly associated
with DTS Total. As can be seen from Table 10, the PTCI sub-scale relating to
negative cognitions about the self (NCAS) accounts for 29 percent of the unique
variance on the DTS scores. However, it is important to point out that although
negative cognitions about the self (NC AS) is the only sub-scale to emerge from the
2 Semi-partial correlations (sr2) indicate the relative importance of each IV in predicting the variance
in DV scores.
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regression as significant, this is not a surprise when one considers the high degree of
association between NCAS and 'self-blame' (r=.638, n=40, p=.000) and between
NCAS and 'negative cognitions about the world' (ff--.668, n=40, p=.000).
The hypothesis is therefore supported as individually, self blame and negative beliefs
about ones' own behaviour in relation to a traumatic event and negative cognitions
about the world are all significantly associated with DTS Total. But for reasons
explained above NCAS emerged as the most important predictor variable in the
regression.
Hypothesis V
Negative cognitions about the world will be associated with paranoid delusional beliefs.
This hypothesis was investigated by means of a parametric correlational analysis (see
Table 11). The results of this analysis show that 'negative cognitions about the world'
(PTCI sub-scale) are not significantly associated with PDI Total scores. More
specifically, the PDI sub-scale 'suspiciousness' is significantly related to 'negative
cognitions about the world'. Overall, however, the hypothesis is not supported.
Tablel I. Correlational analysis of PTCI 'negative cognitions about the world' sub-
scale with PDI total and paranoia sub-scales.
Correlations
PDIPARAN PDIPERSC PDISUSP PDITOTAL
Pearson Correlation	 PCTINCW .178 .293 .332* .205
Sig. (2-tailed)	 PCTINCW .249 .057 .029 .205
PCTINCW 44 43 43 40
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Key: PD!= Peters Delusions Inventory, SUSP= suspicion, PARA= paranoia, PERS= persecution.
PCTINW= negative cognitions about the world.
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Discussion
Summary Of The Findings
Analysis of descriptive data
Analysis of descriptive data revealed that the length of time spent working in the
emergency ambulance service was associated with the DTS total as well as the
intrusion, arousal, avoidance, frequency and severity sub-scales. This suggests that
length of time spent in the service is associated with a higher level of post-trauma
symptoms. Furthermore it appears that there is a relationship between the length of
time spent in the job and the tendency to have a self-blaming attributional style for
negative events. In also appears that males hold more self-blaming beliefs in relation to
traumatic events than females and that technicians hold more of these beliefs than
paramedics. When creating the variable `caseness' for scores on the DTS it also
became evident that 51 percent of the sample did meet the criteria for a diagnosis of
PTSD.
Hypothesis I
According to the MANOVA analysis, there was no overall multivariate effect when
PDI sub-scales and total were examined in relation to DTS `caseness'. Subsequent
univariate F-tests revealed that the sub-scales were however related to DTS caseness,
suggesting that those who scored above 40 and therefore met the diagnostic criteria
for PTSD were more likely to hold delusional beliefs with greater levels of conviction,
distress and were more preoccupied with those beliefs than those who did not meet
PTSD caseness.
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With regard to the more specific MANOVA analysis looking at the sub-scales relating
to persecution, paranoia and suspiciousness in relation to `caseness' on the DTS, there
were no significant effects, contrary to what was predicted.
Hypothesis II
The correlational analyses revealed no significant relationships between PTSD
symptomatology and internal attributions for the cause of the traumatic event or
general attributional style. This was contrary to the predicted hypothesis.
Hypothesis III
The non-parametric correlational analysis examining specific attributions (external-
personal) for the traumatic event and PDI total and sub-scales proved non significant.
The analysis of general attributional style in relation to the PDI total and sub-scales
revealed that the IPSAQ subscales NEGENT and NEGPERS were significantly
associated with all of the PD! sub-scales (see Table 8). Specifically, the NEGPERS
(blaming other people or persons for negative events) sub-scale was highly associated
with all the PDI sub-scales, but in a negative direction. This may mean that the more
participants score on the PD!, then the less likely they are to have an external- personal
attributional style. The hypothesis therefore is not borne out in this case, but there are
interesting implications of the high degree of association between NEGINT (self-
blaming attributional style) and the PD! sub-scales. This suggests that those who hold
a self-blaming attributional style are more likely to hold delusional beliefs (with greater
frequency, preoccupation and conviction) than those who do not.
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The analysis looking specifically at factors loading on predisposition to paranoid
delusions again revealed strong associations with the IPSAQ NEGPERS sub-scale but
in a negative direction (see Table 9). This is contrary to the hypothesis as stated.
However, the NEGINT sub-scale was again highly associated with PDI factors relating
to predisposition to paranoid delusions. This may mean that those participants with a
self-blaming attributional style are more likely to hold paranoid beliefs than those who
do not.
Hypothesis IV
The results of the correlational analysis support the hypothesis, in that there was a
significant association between DTS Total and the PTCI sub-scales. Self-blame,
negative beliefs about ones' own behaviour in relation to a traumatic event and
negative beliefs about the world were all significantly related to DTS Total. This
finding appears to confirm Foa & Riggs' (1993) and Foa & Rothbaum's (1998),
theories of PTSD, which suggest that the persistent sense of threat produced by
viewing the world as a completely dangerous place, and the view that one's self is
totally incompetent mediate the development of PTSD.
In the regression, the IVs accounted for 66 percent of the overall variance in the DTS
total scores. Furthermore, the PTCI sub-scale relating to negative cognitions about
the self (NCAS) accounted for 29 percent of the unique variance on the DTS scores.
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Hypothesis V
Overall the hypothesis was not borne out by the results yielded by the correlational
analysis, in that the 'negative cognitions about the world' sub-scale from the PTCI was
not significantly related to the PD! total. However, there was a significant relationship
between the PD! sub-scale 'suspiciousness' and the PTCI sub-scale 'negative
cognitions about the world'.
Discussion Of The Findings
Methodological Considerations
At this stage it is important to highlight three important methodological issues relevant
to the wider applicability of the results of the present study. First, the low response
rate (nine percent) obtained in this study makes it difficult to determine the exact rate
of PTSD and may limit the generalisability of findings.
Second, the question of whether the sample obtained in this study is representative of
the staff group employed by GMAS at this time was considered. Data were requested
from GMAS to compare with the sample obtained, but unfortunately this proved
problematic. The data required by the author would have to be obtained manually by
GMAS staff as their computer system could not generate this. Due to the time
involved in obtaining this information, GMAS regrettably were unable to provide this
information at this time.
Third, two of the measures used were questionable in terms of their inter-item
correlations (TQ & IPSAQ) and the TQ was also less than ideal in terms of
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Cronbach's Alpha (see Appendix 11). This may mean that the analyses which used
these measures are limited in terms of their validity and generalisability of findings.
However, these measures in question were used in the absence of any other
appropriate and relevant measures.
Another methodological issue worth highlighting is that the variables: Suspiciousness,
Paranoia and Persecution consisted of relatively few items, which came out of the
factor analysis by Peters et al. (1999). The results yielded by analyses using these
variables should be viewed as tentative and future research into this area would benefit
from a more robust measure of these beliefs. The use of these factors in the present
study was one of necessity, in the absence of suitable alternative measures.
In terms of the low response rate, it is possible that this may represent apprehension
regarding possible managerial retribution, or a general feeling of suspiciousness.
Therefore, it may have been preferable not to have included the letter of support
provided by the general manager of the service, in the questionnaire pack sent to the
target sample.
The reliance on self-report measures was less than ideal, however the size of the target
sample and the sensitive nature of the research necessitated the anonymity and
convenience of a postal survey. This ruled out the use of standardised diagnostic
interviews in order to more accurately predict PTSD prevalence. Another benefit of
interview administration of the measures would have been the assistance that could
have been offered to participants in filling in the questionnaires. It was clear to the
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author from phone calls received by participants and incorrectly completed
questionnaires that some aspects of the measures were problematic. Furthermore, in
this sample, it became clear from some of the comments written on the questionnaires
that choosing one incident was difficult considering the nature of the job. Face to face
administration of the measures would have given the opportunity for participants to
seek advice on choosing the event that disturbed them most.
There are no self-report measures available at present that assess the impact of multiple
trauma without repeated administration. In-depth clinical interview may go some way
to assessing the occurrence and impact of multiple, additive or cumulative trauma
more effectively. It may be that the identification of the 'most disturbing trauma' may
in itself be enough to put potential participants off completing self-report measures.
Another possible reason for a low response rate apart from the possible fear of
accessing feared or distressing memories may be that PTSD sufferers do not
automatically link PTSD symptoms to trauma (Jones & Barlow, 1990).
It was clear from visual analysis of the returned questionnaires that some individuals
were responding negatively to every single item on the PDI. This would suggest a
negative response bias in operation. It may be that that participants may have been
concerned that they might be considered 'mad' if they completed this questionnaire. It
is suggested in the literature (Ehlers & Steil, 1995), and clinical experience confirms,
that some individuals with PTSD symptoms make appraisals of their symptoms as
signs of 'going mad'. Participants may have, therefore, endorsed all of the items
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negatively without considering them. This may represent a defensive or avoidant
strategy.
It may, in future research be useful to compare staff who are not currently at work due
to sickness, with those still working on the front-line. This may reveal important
differences in general attributional style, and for traumatic events specifically. It is also
likely that a substantial proportion of these individuals who are on sick leave, are
presenting with physical health problems which are secondary to PTSD. In addition, it
would be interesting to ascertain any marked differences in PTCI scores between these
individuals and those who are still at work.
A measure such as the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg & Frillier,
1979) would also be useful in gaining some awareness of areas secondary to PTSD
such as: social dysfunction, somatic symptoms, anxiety and insomnia and depression.
These types of symptoms are likely to interfere with work and family relationships and
make it even more unlikely that emergency workers will receive help in overcoming
post-traumatic symptoms.
Future research in this area may benefit from a measure of sleep disturbance. Sleep
disturbances are commonly observed in individuals with PTSD and can contribute
considerably to the overall distress experienced by the individual. Indeed, in a study of
emergency ambulance workers in Oxford, 'tiredness at work' was cited as the most
stressful aspect of the job in relation to 'general work conditions' (Clohessy & Ehlers,
1999). This may allow investigators to establish how much sleep problems (particularly
sleep deprivation) contribute to general psychopathology in this sample. In addition it
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would be particularly interesting to explore the extent to which sleep deprivation is
present in this group and the extent to which this makes individuals vulnerable to
psychotic experiences.
Ethical Considerations
Although the covering letters made it explicit that the study was confidential and that
all participants would be anonymous, several participants provided their name and
were therefore potentially traceable. This in itself was not problematic, but some of
those individuals who provided identifying information appeared to be scoring very
highly in terms of either PTSD or delusional symptomatology. This could potentially
have meant that those individuals may be particularly vulnerable to developing further
mental health problems if they continue to be exposed to stress and potentially
traumatic events on a daily basis whilst they work in the emergency ambulance service.
One could assume that the individuals who provided identifying information did so
hoping that they may be offered some kind of help independent of the emergency
ambulance service.
This issue was discussed with the author's supervisor and the manager of GMAS. It
was suggested by the author that the traceable participants who scored above caseness
on the DTS and highly on the PDI be contacted at their home address and provided
with information on PTSD and the services that could provide psychological help.
This idea proved untenable because the author could not be granted access to the
GMAS data base in order to obtain home addresses. An alternative suggested by the
author was to contact all 570 GMAS emergency staff and provide them with
information on PTSD and sources of psychological help. This was agreed by the
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manager of GMAS who asked that this contact be made in early January 2000. He
expressed concerns that a communication of this nature may jeopardise staff morale
over the Christmas and Millennium period and result in an unacceptably high level of
absenteeism at what was predicted to be a time of enormous demand on the emergency
services. There was therefore no other option than to contact every member of the
GMAS emergency services after the holiday period and to provide them all with
information on PTSD and psychological therapies.
Theoretical implications
Rates of likely PTSD (see Table la).
The 51 percent rate of likely PTSD found in this sample is higher than estimates of
lifetime prevalence in the general population, which has been estimated to be eight to
nine percent (Breslau et al., 1991; Kessler et al., 1995). The rates of likely PTSD are
also in excess of those cited by Clohessy & Ehlers (1999) in their study of ambulance
service workers, who reported that 21 percent of their sample met criteria for PTSD.
In a study of London Ambulance Service workers it was found that 15 percent of
frontline staff could be given a diagnosis of PTSD, with another 53 percent meeting
criteria for 'recent mental disturbance' (Rentoul & Ravenscroft, 1993). The reasons
for such marked differences in reported rates of PTSD may be an artefact of
differences in measures or criteria used for diagnosing PTSD. All of the studies cited
above do utilise different methods of assessing PTSD, and this may be an important
factor.
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However, the low response rate (nine percent) obtained in this study makes it
impossible to determine the exact prevalence of PTSD and may limit the
generalizability of findings. There are two possible influences of self-selection on the
results. First, it may be that emergency workers who experience PTSD symptoms may
be more likely to participate than those without PTSD because they view the study as
important. This could possibly result in an overestimation of PTSD prevalence.
Second, despite receiving reassurances that the study was confidential, it mat be that
some emergency workers with PTSD failed to return the questionnaires because they
were concerned that if managers found out that they were experiencing difficulties,
their jobs would be at risk. This fits with suggestions by other researchers that the
psychological impact of their work on emergency personnel is under-reported (Gibbs,
Drummond & Lachenmayer, 1993), or perhaps because they have an investment in
denying their own vulnerability because of their own helping role (Bartone, Ursano,
Wright & Ingraham, 1989).
The finding that length of time spent working in the ambulance service is associated
with greater PTSD symptoms is consistent with studies in the general population
indicating that the number of traumas experienced is predictive of PTSD (Astin,
Ogland-Hand, Coleman, & Foy, 1995; King, King, Foy and Gudanowski, 1996;
Resnick and Kilpatrick, 1994).
This finding is not surprising considering the amount of exposure to traumatic events
the average emergency ambulance worker will have during their career. What predicts
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who will develop PTSD and when is a complex question. However, what these results
tell us is that, of those who embark on a career in the emergency ambulance service,
around half may develop the symptoms of PTSD. Furthermore, the longer one spends
being re-exposed to trauma, then the likelihood of developing PTSD increases. Also
results of the analysis of descriptive data suggests that the longer one spends in the job,
the more likely one is to develop a self- blaming attributional style. This again fits with
these results and research that suggests self-blame in relation to traumatic events is a
major predictor of the development of PTSD (Ehlers and Steil, 1995; Joseph, Brewin,
Yule, and Williams, 1993).
It is interesting to speculate as to the reasons for individuals entering into a profession
which by its very nature will lead one into situations which are complex, frightening
and sometimes dangerous. Moreover, once operating within this system, it is
interesting to speculate as to what motivates individuals to continue when they may be
already experiencing the symptoms of PTSD.
It has been observed that those who have experienced traumatic events often go on to
engage in greater risk taking behaviour. For example, Van der Kolk, Greenberg, Boyd
& 'Crystal (1985) have suggested that war veterans with PTSD often find civilian life
unstimulating and may seek out dangerous and sensational situations as part of
compulsive re-exposure to trauma. This might lead to the prediction that post-
traumatic stress is associated with greater sensation seeking. Zuckerman (1979) has
defined sensation seeking as the need for varied, novel, and complex sensations and
experiences and the willingness to take physical and psychological risks for the sake of
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those experiences. Although the empirical evidence surrounding this hypothesis is
inconclusive at present, a recent study by Joseph, Dalgleish, Thrasher & Yule (1997)
provides evidence in support of this theory. They found that trauma survivors with
high levels of PTSD symptoms scored higher on Impulsiveness (the pathological
aspect of risk taking behaviour) than low PTSD symptom trauma survivors.
This may explain in part why some individuals continue to work and re-expose
themselves to trauma whilst experiencing the symptoms of PTSD.
Rates of delusional ideation (see Table lb).
The mean score on the PDI revealed in this sample was 13.08 (SD=10.34), higher than
the 9.7 (SI 45.7) mean reported score for the healthy sample reported by Peters et al.
(1999). However, the rates in this sample are considerably lower than those reported
by Peters et al. (1999), for a deluded sample (N=20), whose mean score was 20.7
(SD=9.0). These results appear to support the continuity view of psychosis.
The inconclusive results from the analysis of hypothesis I did not support the
hypothesis. They did however, demonstrate that individuals meeting casesness for
PTSD, although holding no more delusional ideas than their lower scoring colleagues,
overall still demonstrated the tendency to hold delusional beliefs with greater
conviction, were more preoccupied and more distressed by the beliefs.
With regard to the non-significant result yielded by the more specific analysis of factors
loading on paranoia, it may be that the cut-off used as a measure of PTSD caseness
may not be a useful one in this context, considering that delusional ideas are thought to
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lie on a continuum with normal beliefs (Bentall, 1990). It may be that those with
PTSD do not hold more delusional ideas but rather they hold their unusual beliefs with
more intensity. This may be accounted for by their need to create meaning and regain
a sense of self in relation to the event, the world, and other people.
The fact that hypothesis II was not supported was contrary to a general consensus in
the literature which cites self-blame in relation to the cause of the traumatic event as a
major predictor of the development of PTSD (Ehlers and Steil, 1995; Joseph, Brewin,
Yule, and Williams, 1993). This may be explained by the notion that emergency
ambulance workers rationalise the death they encounter by reminding themselves that
patients would have even less chance of survival without their intervention
(Rosenberg, 1991).
It may also be that emergency personnel in this sample cognitively avoid memories of
the traumatic event and attempt to correct the past in fantasy as found by Clohessy et
al. (1999), in their study of coping strategies in emergency ambulance workers.
However, the fact that this sample do not display significant levels of self blame in
relation to traumatic events does in itself contradict findings in the literature. The very
low levels of self-blame reported could mean that active strategies of cognitive
avoidance and wishful thinking (attempting to correct the past in fantasy) are
preventing individuals processing traumatic memories emotionally and from putting the
event into the past. Thus the PTSD symptoms will continue to be maintained by these
attempts to cope with distressing traumatic memories (Ehlers & Steil, 1995).
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When considering hypothesis III it is interesting to note that again, overall the results
did not support the hypothesis. However, significant associations were revealed, but in
a negative direction and opposite to what was predicted. The analysis of general
attributional style revealed that the NEGPERS (blaming other people or persons for
negative events) sub-scale was highly associated with all the PDI sub-scales, but in a
negative direction. This suggests, the more participants score on the PDL the less
likely they are to have a general external- personal attributional style. This may indicate
an active strategy of not endorsing items that suggest others are to blame for the
traumatic event. It seems feasible that in order to cope with the daily exposure to
tragedy and loss, one would have to develop some benevolence towards other people.
The contrary view would remove the locus of control from those working in the
emergency ambulance service. This position may be essentially protective, in that
perceived lack of control over the event, aversive events in general, and external locus
of control are generally considered central to PTSD (Mannar et al., 1984).
The significant relationship between NEGINT (self-blaming attributional style) and the
PDI sub-scales suggests that those who hold a self-blaming attributional style are more
likely to hold delusional ideas with a higher degree of conviction, distress and
preoccupation than those who do not.
The analysis looking specifically at factors loading on predisposition to paranoid
delusions again revealed strong associations with the IPSAQ NEGPERS sub-scale but
in a negative direction. This is contrary to the hypothesis as stated and again consistent
with the previous results. This may suggest that those who have a self-blaming
attributional style are more likely to hold paranoid beliefs.
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The notion of self-blame in relation to paranoid beliefs is contrary to that of Lyon,
Kaney, & Bentall (1994), who suggest that individuals who have discrepancies
between their actual view of themselves and their ideal self will, on experiencing a
negative life-event, attribute that event to an external source in order to avoid
activation of this latent discrepancy (self-blame and potential subsequent depression).
However, the 'Bad Me' theory of paranoia forwarded by Chadwick & Trower, (1996)
may be useful in attempting to explain the high degree of association between self-
blame/ internal attributional style and delusional (specifically paranoid) beliefs. This
theory suggests that the bad me paranoid is predisposed to experience the self as
alienated and bad or flawed, and the paranoia is a defence against this subjective self
being revealed through self-presentation behaviour and being objectified by the other.
The fear is not of an absent other, but of an intrusive and controlling one. The bad me
paranoid is prone to interpret others as enormously threatening and powerful, and
himself/herself as weak. The bad me paranoid 'knows' (in the sense of experienced as
a fact not a belief) him/herself to be bad, indeed totally and irrevocably bad, and
therefore deserves to be punished, and conversely is undeserving of being treated with
respect. It continues to suggest that the bad me paranoid believes others are good,
worthy, and superior (even grandiose and omnipotent) and 'I am bad', morally inferior.
There is also a reversal of the self-serving bias presented in the Lyon et al. (1994)
theory of paranoia. In this theory, the person attributes blame for bad outcomes to
self, and responsibility for good outcomes to others.
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It may be that individuals who display this particular style of creating meaning for
negative events have lost their ability to distance themselves from their work
and to positively reframe their role as someone without whom people involved in
trauma would have less of a chance of surviving.
The results in support of hypothesis IV confirm Foa and Rothbaum's (1998) and
Ehlers et al. (1995), theories of PTSD, which suggest that the persistent sense of threat
produced by viewing the world as a completely dangerous place and the view that
one's self is totally incompetent mediate the development of PTSD. Furthermore, the
median score in the present sample was 101.00 (SD=35.58), whereas the Foa et al.
(1999), samples used to standardise the PTCI scale had median scores of 49.00
(SD 23.52) for the 'trauma but no PTSD' group, and 133.00 (SD=44.17) for the
PTSD group. This suggests that the present sample of emergency ambulance workers
as a group are achieving scores that are approaching the scores one would expect from
a sample of individuals who were all experiencing PTSD. This seems to be consistent
with the high rate of PTSD present in the current sample.
Hypothesis V was not supported overall. However, it was of interest to note that
'suspiciousness' was related to 'negative cognitions about the world'. This seems to fit
with the authors' clinical experience of working with individuals who have experienced
PTSD as a result of being assaulted. It has also been suggested that the experience of
trauma reported by people with PTSD shatters their assumptions about self-worth,
vulnerability, equality, and the fairness of the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1985). It would
also be reasonable to assume that the violation of ones' basic assumptions about the
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world, self and others, combined with increased levels of arousal, may lead some
individuals to be suspicious of others as a defensive strategy.
Clinical implications of the findings
The fact that there is such a high rate of PTSD present among the participants of the
present study is not entirely surprising, but the fact that rates are higher than those
cited in other studies of this population should perhaps be viewed tentatively due to the
low response rate. However, the very nature of the work emergency personnel carry
out constitutes close approximation to the criteria presented in DSM IV (APA, 1994),
for developing PTSD. Furthermore, ambulance service workers respond to more
emergency calls than the police and fire service combined (James & Wright, 1991) and
may suffer greater psychological distress than these other groups (Mannar, Wiess,
Metzler, Ronfeldt & Foreman, 1996).
The implications of the present findings may have far reaching effects on the way in
which emergency personnel are supported during the course of their careers. At the
time of writing, it appears that in the present sample there are high proportions of staff
continuing to work on the 'front line' as paramedics or technicians who are
experiencing in full or part, the symptoms of PTSD. These staff will be exposed to
subsequent trauma and may experience a worsening of symptoms or a deterioration
into the full PTSD syndrome.
According to the literature there is also a high level of co-morbidity with other
psychiatric disorders for those experiencing PTSD. Kessler et al. (1995) suggest that
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in the general population 83 percent of individuals with PTSD meet the criteria for
another DSM IV (APA, 1994) psychiatric disorder. Anxiety, panic disorder, multiple
phobic avoidance, marital and family disturbances, work impairment, depression,
alcohol/substance abuse, and suicide are commonly associated with untreated PTSD
(Deering, Glover, Ready, Eddleman, & Alarcon, 1996; Marmar et al., 1994; Rozell,
McFall & Malas, 1991). Recent research has documented many examples of these
disorders being present in PTSD samples (see Yule, Williams & Joseph (1999), for a
review of co-morbidity in PTSD (p.8-10)). In addition to PTSD, survivors of trauma
may also undergo enduring personality changes (Horowitz, 1986a, 1986b).
The potential increase in substance abuse associated with PTSD is perhaps an area for
concern in this particular population. Large increases in the use of alcohol, cigarettes,
sleeping tablets, anti-depressants, and tranquillisers some 30 months after the event
have been documented in adult PTSD survivors (Joseph, Yule, Williams, &
Hodglcinson, 1993). All of these may contribute to poor performance in emergency
ambulance service staff.
There are potential implications in terms of sickness and absenteeism as a result of the
high rates of physical health problems observed in PTSD survivors (Yule, Williams &
Joseph, 1999). It could be argued that many of these problems are a result of
depression but nonetheless they are a reality to many PTSD survivors.
Impaired psychosocial adjustment and a reduced level of occupational functioning are
prominent features of PTSD and are of major concern to agencies dealing with large
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groups of individuals with the disorder (Gil, Calev, Greenberg, Kugelmass, & Lerer,
1989). Gil et al. (1989), go on to present findings that suggest cognitive deficits
secondary to PTSD may substantially contribute to these difficulties and that the
pattern of generalised cognitive deficits is similar to that of other psychiatric disorders,
such as depression (Calev & Erwin, 1985) and schizophrenia (Calev, Venables, &
Monk, 1983). More recently, experimental cognitive psychologists have established
that individuals with PTSD also demonstrate autobiographical memory disturbances
(McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995).
Research also suggests that untreated PTSD which persists beyond three to five
months following trauma, is unlikely to resolve over time (Mannar et al., 1994).
Considering the average time since the identified trauma in the present sample is 67
months (5.5 years), the PTSD present in this sample is unlikely to resolve over time for
a substantial proportion of participants.
Implications for the Emergency Ambulance Service
Some form of regular screening for the symptoms of PTSD would be desirable, but
may be difficult to resolve ethically. Perhaps as part of a general medical examination
it could be offered as a voluntary option or maybe a self-report measure could be
available for personnel to assess their own levels of PTSD symptomatology.
It would certainly be more ethical and perhaps cause less conflict between management
and staff, if each individual was able to monitor their own level of symptomatology and
took responsibility for that. Perhaps a 'warning signs' monitoring package could be
developed similar to those used in the area of relapse prevention in psychosis
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(Birchwood, 1996). This could perhaps include psycho-educational materials,
normalising information and information about the vicious circle of intrusions and
thought suppression. Ambulance service workers who find it difficult to cope with
traumatic memories may need to learn that mental disengagement is counter
productive in coming to terms with them. Information on how to make an 'exposure
tape' or on how imaginal exposure can facilitate emotional processing might be useful.
At the time of writing there are sparse references to self-help packages in the literature
in relation to PTSD, and this may be an area for future consideration. This type of
intervention would probably need to be supervised by a trained therapist to some
extent, but the fact that individuals are continuing to work while experiencing PTSD
symptoms suggests that traditional routes of accessing professional help are regarded
as aversive to at least a large proportion of the present sample.
With regard to the delusional ideation present in this sample, it may be useful to
provide some normalising information on this subject. It is likely that those holding
beliefs that are distressing or paranoid in nature may need the security of a trusting
therapeutic relationship to explore these beliefs in relation to their work experiences
and possible PTSD symptoms.
The difficulty here is facilitating access to services for these individuals. It may be that
these individuals who hold unusual beliefs that cause them distress and result in high
levels of preoccupation developed these beliefs out of an attempt to create meaning for
the traumatic events they have witnessed. It may be that these ideas were present
before exposure and were activated by a particular trauma or series of traumas. In
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either case, professional psychological assessment and time-limited treatment may be
the best course of action. Research has demonstrated that cognitive behavioural
therapy delivered by trained therapists in a Community Mental Health Team setting is
effective in reducing global distress, severity, impairment, frequency, conviction and
control associated with delusional beliefs at the end of treatment. This research
suggests that the efficacious cognitive behavioural interventions that have been shown
to be possible for delusions are indeed transportable to real-life settings (Morrison,
Renton, Williams, Dunn, Nothard & Payton, 1999).
Implications for future research
Finally, it may be important to emphasise that although most research has focused on
the impact of disasters, emergency workers are commonly exposed to 'smaller scale'
traumatic events such as road traffic accidents, suicides or cot deaths (Clohessy et al.,
1999). In a study by Marmar et al. (1996) three groups of emergency workers were
compared. One group had been involved in a rescue operation after a major disaster,
the other two reported on normal operational duties which had distressed them. It was
discovered that there was no difference in current symptomatology between the three
groups, suggesting that everyday operational duties can be just as traumatic and
stressful for emergency staff as disaster work. These results demonstrate a need for
increased awareness amongst emergency service management about the effects of
everyday duties upon their staff and a need for further research on PTSD arising from
normal operational duties in the emergency services.
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Further research is needed in this area and those undertaking such work may want to
emphasise confidentiality, anonymity and their independence from the emergency
service management in order to maximise the chances of a good response rate.
As mentioned earlier, it may be interesting to look at sleep difficulties and other
general psychopathology as secondary to PTSD and examine how that might affect
vulnerability to psychotic phenomena. Comparing individuals who are on 'sick leave'
and those who are still working on the front-line may allow interesting comparisons
between these two groups.
Future research into methods of measuring cumulative trauma would be invaluable, as
would further investigation into the area of 'compulsive re-exposure to trauma' (Van
der Kolk et al., 1985) within this particular population.
Conclusion
This investigation set out to assess the prevalence of PTSD, explore the relationship
between attributional factors associated with PTSD and delusional beliefs (particularly
paranoia). Although these aims were addressed, the results of this investigation have
raised further questions and highlighted areas for further research. Areas for possible
changes in the way emergency ambulance personnel are supported have also been
highlighted. The fact that this study has drawn on areas of the literature which are
rarely combined will perhaps raise awareness and provoke discussion.
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Appendix 1
DSM-IV Criteria For PTSD
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following
were present.
(I) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of self or others.
(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.
Note: In children, this may be expressed instead by disorganised or agitated behaviour.
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following
ways.
(I) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images,
thoughts, or perceptions. Note: In young children, repetitive play may occur in
which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children there may be
frightening dreams without recognisable content.
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes,
including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young
children, trauma-specific re-enactment may occur.
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external clues that
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
F. The disturbance causes significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning.
PTSD is defined as:
Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than 3 months.
Chronic: if duration of symptoms is 3 months or more.
With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least 6 months after the stressor.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of
the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma.
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma.
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities.
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others.
(6) restricted range of affect (e.g. unable to have loving feelings).
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g. does not expect to have a career, marriage,
children, or a normal life span).
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as
indicated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep.
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger.
(3) difficulty concentrating.
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response.
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than one
month.
Appendix 2
1CD-10 Criteria For PrS'D
PTSD arises as a delayed and/or protracted response to a stressful event or situation
(either short or long lasting) of an exceptionally threatening or catastrophic nature,
which is likely to cause pervasive distress in almost anyone (e.g. natural or man made
disaster, combat, serious accident, witnessing the violent death of others or being the
victim of torture, terrorism, rape, or other crime). Predisposing factors such as
personality traits or previous history of neurotic illness may indicate vulnerability (but
they are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain its occurrence). This condition must
arise within six months of the traumatic event.
There must be a repetitive, intrusive recollection or re-enactment of the event in
memories, daytime imagery, or dreams.
Appendix 3
DSM-1V Criteria For Schizophrenia & Other Psychotic Disorders
Schizophrenia 
A. Characteristic Symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a
significant portion of time during a one month period (or less if successfully treated):
(I) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganised speech (e.g. frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's
behaviour or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each other.
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the
onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work,
interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to
the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve
expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least six months. This
six month period must include at least one month of symptoms (or less if
successfully treated) that meet Criterion A (i.e. active-phase symptoms) and may
include periods of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or
residual periods, the signs of disturbance may be manifested by only negative
symptom, or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present in an attenuated
form (e.g., off beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).
D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder and Mood
disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because either (I) no Major
Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-
phase symptoms; or (2) if mood episodes have occurred during active-phase
symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative to the duration of the active
and residual periods.
E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the
direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, medication) or a
general medical condition.
F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history of
Autistic Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional
diagnosis of Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are
also present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated).
Schizophreniform Disorder
A. Criteria	 A,	 D,	 and	 E	 of	 Schizophrenia	 are	 met.
B. An episode of the disorder (including prodromal, active, and residual phases) lasts
at least one month but less than six months. (When the diagnosis must be made
without waiting for recovery, it should be qualified as "provisional.").
Schizoaffective Disorder
A. An interrupted period of illness during which, at some time, there is either a lajor
Depressive Episode, a Manic Episode, or a Mixed Episode concurrent with symptoms
that meet Criterion A for Schizophrenia.
Note: The Major Depressive Episode must include Criterion Al: depressed mood.
B. during the same period of illness, there have been delusions or hallucinations for at
least two weeks in the absence of prominent mood symptoms.
C. Symptoms that meet criteria for a mood disorder are present for a substantial
portion orthe total duration of the active and residual periods of the illness.
D. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.
Brief Psychotic Disorder	 _
A. Presence of one (or more) of the following symptoms:
(1) delusions
(2)hallucinations
(3)disorganised speech (e.g. frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour
Note: Do not include a symptom if it is a culturally sanctioned response pattern.
B. Duration of an episode of the disturbance is at least one day but less than one
month, with eventual full return to premorbid level of functioning.
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by a Mood Disorder With Psychotic
Features, Schizoaffective disorder, of Schizophrenia and is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication or a general
medical condition.
Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder
A. Prominent hallucinations or delusions. Note: Do not include hallucinations if the
person has insight that they are substance induced.
B. There is evidence from the history, physical examination, of a laboratory findings of
either (1) or (2):
(I) the symptoms in Criterion A developed during, of within a month of substance
intoxication or withdrawal
(2) medication use is etiologically related to the disturbance
	 -
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by a Psychotic Disorder that is not
substance induced. Evidence that the symptoms are better accounted for by a
Psychotic Disorder that is not substance induced might include the following: the
symptoms precede the onset of the substance use (or medication use); the symptoms
persist for a substantial period of time (e.g., about a month) after the cessation of acute
withdrawal or severe intoxication, or a substantially in excess of would be expected
given the type or amount of the substance used or the duration of use; of there is other
evidence that suggests the existence of an independent non-substance-induced
Psychotic Disorder (e.g., a history or recurrent non-substance-related episodes).
D. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of a delirium.
Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
This category includes psychotic symptomatology (i.e. delusions, hallucinations,
disorganised speech, grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour) about which there is
inadequate information to make a specified diagnosis or about which there is a
contradictory information, or disorders with psychotic symptoms that do not meet the
criteria for any specific Psychotic Disorder.
Note: DSM-IV's Delusional Disorder, Shared Psychotic Disorder, Psychotic Disorder
Due to a General Medical Condition, are not outlined as they are not considered
central to the research, and there are no subjects with such diagnoses included in the
research sample.
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Covering Letters & Reminder Letter
About the research and invitation to take part.
You are being invited to take part in a research project which will investigate people's
experience of distress following traumatic events whilst working as part of the
emergency ambulance service.
This study is being conducted by myself, Warren Larkin, (Clinical Psychologist in
Training) and Dr. Tony Momson & Dr. Lucy Frame (both qualified clinical
psychologists). We will be contacting all ambulance technician / paramedic
personnel in the Manchester area and asking them to take part in this study.
If you decide to take part in this study you should complete the enclosed
questionnaires, which ask questions about your experiences of trauma, and the
distress that this caused.
This study is not intended to cause you any distress, but you are welcome to ask any
questions you may have or to discuss any issues that are raised for you by filling out
the questionnaires. If you do . experience distress as a result of completing the
questionnaires, please contact Warren Larkin, Clinical Psychologist in Training; on
You can also contact Dr. Tony Morrison or Dr. Lucy Frame at the Department of
Clinical Psychology, on "	 . (If we are not immediately available, then
you can leave a message and contact number and you will be contacted as soon as
possible).
Your answers will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and there will be no way
of identifying who filled in the questionnaires.
You do not have to take part in the study if you do not wish to do so; however it
would be appreciated if you could return any unused questionnaires in the freepost
envelope provided.
If you do fill in the questionnaires and return them in the freepost envelope provided,
this will be regarded as an indication of your consent to take part, in the study.
The results of this study will be available from: Mr. 	 , Ambulance HQ,
, when the study is complete (June 2000).
Thank you very much for your time.
Warren Larkin (Clinical Psychologist in Training).
4 August 1999
RGW/SLM
Dear Colleague
As I am sure you are all aware, debate and discussion has occurred at all levels both
within and outside of the Ambulance Service over the issue of "post traumatic stress".
As you know counselling is available within GMAS for incidents that cause concern
to individuals. However, the more recent debate is over the effects of accumulated
incident stress over years of continuous service.
Mr Warren Larkin, a Clinical Psychologist, is undertaking a study on this issue and
has asked to use our Service as a study group. I have agreed to this on the basis that
we will see the findings first and in advance of published papers in order to identify
any long term change requirements.
The questionnaire is enclosed and is a fully confidential and "hidden" study. I would
urge all staff to participate to enable greater understanding for improving conditions
in the future.
Thank you for you assistance on this matter.
Yours sincerely
General Manager - PES
STOR IN PEOPLE
Dear Paramedic/Technician,
I would firstly like to thank all those who took time to return the questionnaires that I sent out
to GMAS employees in September.
The information I have been able to take from these questionnaires looks like it will be
invaluable in furthering a psychological understanding of Trauma reactions in
Paramedic/Technicians.
However, I need a few more questionnaires to make sure the study is scientifically valid and
therefore publishable
If you have not already filled in and/or returned the questionnaires you received, it would be a
great help to myself and my colleagues if you could do so in the next few days.
As mentioned in the original covering letter included with the questionnaire; the study is
completely confidential and you are not asked to give your name.
The results of the study will be available from Ambulance HQ as soon as it is complete.
Once again, thank you for your time.
Best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
WARREN LARKIN
(Clinical Psychologist in Training).
Appendix 5
The Davidson Trauma Scale
Name:
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DAVIDSON TRAUMA SCALE
by Jonathan R.T. Davidson, M.D.
Age:	 Sex: fJ Male 0 Female
Date:
Please identify the trauma that is most disturbing to you.
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I. Have you ever had painful images, memories, or thoughts of the event?
2. Have you ever had distressing dreams of the event?
3. Have you felt as though the event was recurring? Was it as if you were reliving it?
4. Have you been upset by something that reminded you of the event?
5. Have you been physically upset by reminders of the event? (This includes
sweating, trembling, racing heart, shortness of breath, nausea, or diarrhea.)
6. Have you been avoiding any thoughts or feelings about the event?
7. Have you been avoiding doing things or going into situations that remind you of
the event?
8. Have you found yourself unable to recall important parts of the event?
9. Have you had difficulty enjoying things?
10. Have you felt distant or cut off from other people?
11. Have you been unable to have sad or loving feelings?
12. Have you found it hard to imagine having a long life span and fulfilling your goals?
13. Have you had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep?
14. Have you been irritable or had outbursts of anger?
15. Have you had difficulty concentrating?
16. Have you felt on edge, been easily distracted, or had to stay "on guard"?
17. Have you been jumpy or easily startled?
Appendix 6
The Trauma Questionnaire
Trauma Questionnaire
Sex:
	
	 Paramedic or Technician (Please
Circle)
Age: 	
	
Length of Time In Emergency
Services
Please identify the trauma that is most disturbing to you:
Instructions
Please read the following statements and try to answer them in relation to the trauma
that you described above as the most disturbing to you. Try to decide what the main
cause of the event you described above was and place a mark on the line at the point
you feel most appropriate.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
How long ago was the trauma that you have identified as most disturbing to
you?
Years
	 Months
1. As I think about it now, I believe that the trauma was as a result of:
a) Something about me
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
b) Something about another person (or a group of people)
0	 I 	 1100
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
c) Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)
0	 I 	 1100
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
2. At the time of the trauma, I believed that the trauma was as a result of:
a) Something about me
01	 1100
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
b) Something about another person (or a group of people)
01	 1100
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
c) Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)
01 	 1100
As little as	 As much as
possible	 possible
Appendix 7
The Post Traumatic Cognitions Inventory
PIC!
We are interested in the kind of thoughts which you may have had after a
traumatic experience. Below are a number of statements that may or may not be
representative of your thinking.
Please read each statement carefully and tell us how much you AGREE or
DISAGREE with each statement.
People react to traumatic events in many different ways. There are no right or
wrong answers to these statements.
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Totally	 Disagree	 Disagree	 Agree	 Agree	 Totally
Disagree Very Much	 Slightly	 Neutral
	
Slightly Very Much
	 Agree
1. The event happened because of the way I acted.
2. I can't trust that I will do the right thing.
3. I am a weak person.
4. I will not be able to control my anger and will do something terrible.
5. I can't deal with even the slightest upset.
6. I used to be a happy person but now I am always miserable.
7. People can't be trusted.
8. I have to be on guard all the time.
9. I feel dead inside.
10. You can never know who will harm you.
11. I have to be especially careful because you never know what can
happen next.
12. I am inadequate.
13. I will not be able to control my emotions, and something terrible will
happen.
14. If I think about the event, I will not be able to handle it.
15. The event happened to me because of the sort of person I am.
16. My reactions since the event mean that I am going crazy.
17. I will never be able to feel normal emotions again.
18. The world is a dangerous place.
19. Somebody else would have stopped the event from happening.
A 1PTC1 00C
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PTCI
(continued)
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Totally	 Disagree	 Disagree	 Agree	 Agree	 Totally
Disagree Very Much
	 Slightly	 Neutral	 Slightly Very Much
	 Agree
20. I have permanently changed for the worse.
21. I feel like an object, not like a person.
22. Somebody else would not have gotten into this situation.
23. I can't rely on other people.
24. I feel isolated and set apart from others.
25. I have no future.
26. I can't stop bad things from happening to me.
27. People are not what they seem.
28. My life has been destroyed by the trauma.
29. There is something wrong with me as a person.
30. My reactions since the event show that I am a lousy coper.
31. There is something about me that made the event happen.
32. I will not be able to tolerate my thoughts about the event, and I will
fall apart.
33. I feel like I don't know myself anymore.
34. You never know when something terrible will happen.
35. I can't rely on myself.
36. Nothing good can happen to me anymore.
A Irra DOC
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Appendix 8
The Internal Personal And Situational Attributions Questionnaire
I.P.S.A.Q.
Name:	 Sex:
Age: 	 	 Occupation: 	
Date Completed:
INSTRUCTIONS
Please read the statements on the following pages. For each statement please try to vividly imagine
that event happening to you. Then try to decide what was the main cause of the event described in
each statement. Please write the cause you have thought of in the space provided. Then tick the
appropriate letter (a,b or c) according to whether the cause is :
a) Something about you
b) Something about another person (or a group of people)
c) Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)
It might be quite difficult to decide which of these options is exactly right. In this case, please pick one
option, the option which best represents your opinion. Please pick only one letter in each case.
Thank you for your time and co-operation.
Note For Users
This scale was designed by Peter Kinder-man and Prof. Richard P. Bentall, of the Department of Clinical Psychok
Building, P.O. Box 147, Liverpool, L69 3BX, based on previous work by McArthur.(1 972) and Bentall, Kaney
(1991). The scale is a research tool and should not be used for routine clinical assessment. Permission is gr.,
use in research protocols on condition that the authors are first notified.
References 
Bentall, R.P., Kaney, S., & Dewey, M.E. (1991) Paranoia and social reasoning: An attribution theory analysis. British Journal
of Clinical Psychology. 30. 13-23.
McArthur, L.A. (1972) The how and what of why: Some determinants and consequences of causal attribution. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 22. 171-193.
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1.	 A friend gave you a lift home.
What caused your friend to give you a lift home?
(Please wnte down the one major cause)
.............................................................................
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
2.	 A friend talked about you behind your back.
What caused your friend to talk about you behind your back?
(Please write.down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you? •
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
3.	 A friend said that he(she) has no respect for you.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) has no respect for you ?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
4.	 A friend helped you with the gardening.
What caused your friend to help you with the gardening?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
C.	 Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
2
5.	 A friend thinks you are trustworthy.
What caused your fnend to think you are trustworthy?
(Please write down the one major cause)
..........
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
6.	 A friend refused to talk to you.
What caused your friend to refuse to talk to you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
7.	 A friend thinks you are interesting.
What caused your friend to think you are interesting?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
8.	 A friend sent you a postcard.
What caused your friend to send you a postcard?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
3
9.	 A friend thinks you are unfriendly.
What caused your friend to think that you are unfriendly?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
10.	 A friend made an Insulting remark to you.
What caused your friend to insult you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
11.	 A friend bought you a present.
What caused your friend to buy you a present.
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
12.	 A friend picked a fight with you.
What caused your friend to fight with you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
13.	 A friend thinks you are dishonest.
What caused your friend to think you are dishonest?
(Please wnte down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
14.	 A friend spent some time talking to you.
What caused your friend to spend time talking with you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
15.	 A friend thinks you are clever.
What caused your friend to think you are clever?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
16.	 A friend thinks you are sensible.
What caused your friend to think that you were sensible?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
17 .
	A friend refused to help you with a job.
What caused your friend to refuse to help you with the job?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a.	 Something about you ?
b	 Something about the other person or other people ?
c.	 Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
18.	 A friend thinks you are unfair.
What caused your friend to think that you are unfair'?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
19.	 A friend said that he(she) dislikes you.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) dislikes you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
20.	 A friend rang to enquire about you.
What caused your friend to ring to enquire about you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
21.	 A friend ignored you
What caused your fnend to ignore you?
(Please wnte down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
22.	 A friend said that she(he) admires you.
What caused your Mend to say that she(he) admired you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
23.	 A friend said that he(she) finds you boring.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) finds you boring?
(Please write down the one major cause)
i	 Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
24.	 A friend said that she(he) resents you.
What caused your friend to say that she(he) resents you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
25.	 A friend visited you for a friendly chat.
What caused your friend to visit you for a chat?
(Please wnte down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
26.	 A friend believes that you are honest
What caused your friend to believe that you are honest?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ? •
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
27.	 A friend betrayed the trust you had in her.
What caused your friend to betray your trust?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
28.	 A friend ordered you to leave.
What caused your friend to order you to leave?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
C.	 Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
29.	 A friend said that she(he) respects you.
What caused your mend to say that she(he) respects you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
30.	 A friend thinks you are stupid.
What caused your friend to think that you are stupid?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
31.	 A friend said that he(she) liked you.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) liked you?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)?
32.	 A neighbour invited you In for a drink.
What caused your friend to invite you in for a drink?
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
INTERNAL, PERSONAL, AND SITUATIONAL ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE
SCORING KEY
Each item describes the action of an actor towards a target person. Subjects have to choose one of
three possible explanations for each action.
a. An internal attribution
b. An external, personal, attribution
c. An external, situational, attribution
Positive 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32
Negative: 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30
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The Peters' Delusions Inventory
RELIGION 	  PROFESSION DATE.--..
Do you ever feel as if
you can read other
people's minds?
(please circle)
Very
distressing
4	 5
Think about it
all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1 2 3
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3
Hardly ever
think about it
4	 5
Think about it
all the time
4	 5
Believe it is
absolutely true
4	 5
1
No Yes
P. D. I.
This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We believe that
they are much more common than has previously been supposed, and that most people have had
some such experiences during their lives. Please answer the following questions as honestly as
you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and there are no trick questions. Please note that
we are NOT interested in experiences people may have had when under the influence of
drugs.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS.
For the questions you answer YES to, we are interested in: (a) how distressing these beliefs or
experiences are; (b) how often you think about them; and (c) how true you believe them to be.
On the right hand side of the page we would like you to circle the number which corresponds
most closely to how distressing this belief is, how often you think about it, and how much you
believe that it is true.
SEX	
	  ETHNIC BACKGROUND	 AGE
Examples:
Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all	 Very
people are
	
distressing	 distressing
your mind?
(please circle)
Na yes .->
>	 Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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(please circle)
No Yes ---->
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
I 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
I 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
its true
1 2 3 4
Please circle if answered YES
(1) Do you ever feel as if	 NM at all	 Very
you arc under the control	 distressing	 distressing
of some force or power other
	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5
than yourself?
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(2) Do you ever feel as if you
are a robot or zombie without
a will of your own?
(please circle)
-
No	 Yes 	
	 >
(3) Do you ever feel as if you
are possessed by someone or
something else?
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
(4) Do you ever feel as if
your feelings or actions are
not under your control?
(please circle)
No Yes ---->
(5) Do you ever feel as if
someone or something is
playing games with your
mind?
(please circle)
No	 Yes	 	 >
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(please circle)
No	 Yes
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	
(please circle)
No	 Yes
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it 	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
2	 3	 4	 5
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	  ->
Please circle if answered YES
(6) Do you ever feel as if people 	 Not at all	 Very
seem to drop hints about you	 distressing	 distressing
or say things with a double	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
meaning?
(please circle)
No	 Yes
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it 	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(7) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
things in magazines or on TV	 distressing	 distressing
were written especially for
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
you?
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it
	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(8) Do you ever think that	 Not at all
	
Very
everyone is gossiping about	 distressing
	 distressing
you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(9) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
some people are not what	 distressing	 distressing
they seem to be?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it
	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(10) Do things around you 	 Not at all	 Very
ever feel unreal, as though 	 distressing	 distressing
it was all part of an	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
experiment?
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(please circle)
No	 Yes
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
Please circle If answered YES
(II) Do you ever feel as if
	 Not at all	 Very
someone is deliberately 	 distressing	 distressing
trying to harm you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No Yes----->
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(12) Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all	 Very
you are being persecuted 	 distressing	 distressing
in some way?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
>
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
I	 2	 3	 4	 5
(13) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
there is a conspiracy against	 distressing	 distressing
you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle) 	 think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No	 Yes 	 >
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
I	 2	 3	 4	 5
(14) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
some organisation or institution	 distressing	 distressing
basic in for you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(15) Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all	 Very
someone or something is	 distressing	 distressing
watching you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it 	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No Yes ---->
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
44
(17) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all
there is a special purpose	 distressing
or mission to your life?	 1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
1
(18) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all
there is a mystenous power 	 distressing
working for the good of the	 1
world?
Hardly ever
(please cu-cle)	 think about it
1
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
(19) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all
you are or destined to be	 distressing
someone very important? 	 1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
1
(20) Do you ever feel that	 Not at all
you are a very special or 	 distressing
unusual person?	 I
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
1
No Yes ----->
Don't believe
it's true
1
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very •
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Please circle if answered YES
(16) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
you have special abilities 	 distressing	 distressing
or powers?
	
2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
2	 3	 4	 5
No
Don't believe	 Believe it is
its true
1
absolutely true
52 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
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Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
Very
distressing
5
Please circle If answered YES
(21) Do you ever feel that you
	 Not at all
	 Very
are especially close to God?	 distressing
	 distressing
5
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
(22) Do you ever think that
people can communicate
telepathically?
(please circle)
No	 Yes  -	 >
(23) Do you ever feel as if
electrical devices such as
computers can influence
the way you think?
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
(24) Do you ever feel as if
there are forces around you
which affect you in strange
ways?
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
(25) Do you ever feel as if you
have been chosen by God in
some way?
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
1
Hardly ever
think about it
2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1	 2 3 4 5
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
.it's true
1 2 3 4
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(please circle)
No	 Yes
(please circle)
No	 Yes .	 >
No	 Yes >
Please circle if answered YES
(26) Do you believe in the	 Not at all	 Very
power of witchcraft, voodoo	 distressing	 distressing
or the occult?	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
I	 2	 3	 4	 5
>
Don't believe
	
Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
I	 1	 3	 4	 5
(27) Are you often womed	 Not at all	 Very
that your partner may be 	 distressing	 distressing
unfaithful?	 I	 /	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(28) Do you ever think that	 Not at all	 Very
you smell very unusual to	 distressing	 distressing
other people?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(29) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all	 Very
your body is changing in a	 distressing	 distressing
peculiar way?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No	 Yes 	 >
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(30) Do you ever think that	 Not at all	 Very
strangers want to have	 distressing	 distressing
sex with you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)
	
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No	 Yes 	 >
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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Don't believe
its true
(32) Do you ever feel that	 Not at all
people look at you oddly 	 distressing
because of your appearance?	 1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
1
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
1
(33) Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all
you had no thoughts in	 distressing
your head at all? 	 1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
1
(34) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all
your insides might be rutting?
	
distressing
1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
1
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
its true
1
(35) Do you ever feel as if	 Not at all
the world is about to cad?
	
distressing
1
Hardly ever
(please circle)	 think about it
No	 Yes 	
Don't believe
it's true
1
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Very
distressing
5
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
Please circle if answered YES
(3 l) Do you ever feel that you	 Not at all	 Very
have sinned more than the 	 distressing	 distressing
average person?
	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
2	 3	 4	 5
No	 Yes 	
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
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(please circle)
No	 Yes 	
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	
(please circle)
No	 Yes 	 >
Very
distressing
5
Please circle If answered YES
(36) Do your thoughts ever 	 Not at all	 Very
feel alien to you in 	 distressing	 distressing
some way?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(please circle)
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it
	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No Yes------->
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(37) Have your thoughts ever	 Not at all	 Very
been so vivid that you were	 distressing	 distressing
worried other people would	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
hear them?
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(38) Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all	 Very
your own thoughts were being	 distressing	 distressing
echoed back to you?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Hardly ever	 Think about it
think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Don't believe	 Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
(39) Do you ever feel as if 	 Not at all	 Very -
your thoughts were blocked 	 distressing	 distressing
by someone or something	 I	 2	 3	 4	 5
else?
Hardly ever	 Think about it
(please circle)	 think about it	 all the time
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
No	 Yes 	 >
Don't believe
	
Believe it is
it's true	 absolutely true
5
(40) Do you ever feel as if
other people can read your
mind?
Think about it
all the time
5
Believe it is
absolutely true
5
1 2 3 4
Not at all
distressing
1 2 3 4
Hardly ever
think about it
1 2 3 4
Don't believe
it's true
1 2 3 4
49
Sum A
21 = 	 (Score)
Note: Items 13, 32, and 34
are experimental and are
therefore not included in
subscales.
PTO Scoring Key
Negative Cognitions
	
Negative Cognitions
about Self	 about the World
Self-Blame
2 7 1
3 8 15
4 10 19
5 11 22
6 18 31
9 23
12
.27 Sum C
14
16 Sum B + 5 =	 (Score)
17
20 + 7 = (Score)
21
24 Total Score
25
26 Sum A
28 Sum B
29 Sum C
30
33 Sum of A, B, C
35 (Score)
36
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Appendix 10
Frequencies: Screening for normality
Statistics
N Std.
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Range_Valid Missing Mean
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error Statistic
AGE 50 1 40.3800 8.8061 -.187 .337 -.749 .662 34.00
CASENESS 45 6 .5111 .5055 -.046 .354 -2.093 .695 1.00
DTSAROUS 45 6. 19.0000 12.5354 .157 .354 -.967 .695 40.00
DTSAVOID 45 6 16.7556 15.1420 .690 .354 -.633 .695 48.00
•	 DTSFREQ 45 6 25.7556 17.6083 .524 .354 -.733 .695 64.00
DTSINTRU 45 6 16.1333 11.1998 .259 .354 -.904 .695 40.00
DTSTOTAL 45 6 51.8889 35.7054 .467 .354 -.792 .695 128.00
IPSAONEG 35 16 25.7429 4.1327 .573 .398 .114 .778 18.00
•	 IPSAQPOS. 36 15 25.5833 4.3907 .248 .393 .559 .768 2200.
NEGINT 42 9 5.0952 3.2371 1.133 .365 1.582 .717 15.00
NEGINTSQ 42 9 2.1343 .7439 -.122 .365 .943 .717 3.87
NEGPERS 42 9 5.7619 3.1992 -.045 .365 -.610 .717 12.00
NEGSIT 42 9 5.0952 3.2371 1.133 .365 1.582 .717 15.00
NEGSITSQ 42 9 1.7899 .7232 -.180 .365 .664 .717 3.46
POSINT 43 8 6.6744 2.3576 .056 .361 .824 .709 12.00
POSPERS 43 8 •	 3.2558 2.0827 .887 .361 .439 .709 9.00
POSSIT 42 9 5.0952 3.2371 1.133 .365 1.582 .717 15.00
POSSITSQ 43 8 1.5569 .7199 -.395 .361 .403 .709 2.83
JOBTIM 50 1 191 g800 97.5134 -.357 .337 -.738 .662 378.00
PCTINCAS 45 6 60.8667 26.2666 .495 .354 -.699 .695 94.00
PCTINCVV 45 6 33.0000 8.8523 -.739 .354 .922 .695 42.00
PCTISB 45 6 9.7333 4.4436 .807 .354 -.34.4 .695 16.00
PCTISESSQ 45 6 3.0446 .6887 .501 .354 -.791 .695 2.35
PCTITOT 45
.
6 103.6000 35.5843 .220 .354 -.810 .695 140.00
PDICON 51 0 35.5294 30.7190 1.072 .333 1.575 0.656 142.00
PDICONSQ 51 0 5.2175 2.9109 -.151 .333 -.583 .656 11.92
PDIDIST 51 0 31.9020 31.5603 1.541 .333 3.001 .656 139.00
PDIDISQ 51 0 4.8351 2.9487 .148 .333 -.405 .656 11.79
PDIFREQ 51 0 29.5490 27.7332 1.385 .333 2.652 .556 133.00
PDIFRSQ 51 0 4.6970 2.7636 .031 .333 -.469 .656 11.53
PDIPARAN 50 1 1.5200 1.3438 .481 .337 -.840 .662 4.00
PDIPERSC 49 2 2.0000 1.7912 .386 .340 -1.165 .688 5.00
PDISUSP 49 2 1.7347 1.1324 -.256 .340 -1.350 .668 3.00
PDITOTAL
time since
trauma in
months
46
ao
0	 5
11
13.0870
67.7750
10.3426
80.9291
.929
1.229
.350
.374
.470
.100
.688
733
40.00
239.00
TIMELOG	
- 40 11 1.4197 .6998 -.353 .374 -.746 .733 2.38
Appendix 11
Reliability analysis summary table
Reliability Inter-item correlation Alpha
DTS .4923 .9707
PTCI .3664 .9539
PDI .3101 .9460
IPSAQ .0850 .7431
TQ .6462 .2037
Appendix12
Correlation Matrix For Analysis Of Descriptive Data
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Appendix 13
Independent Samples t-tests for job type
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation t d.f. p
DTS AROUS .943 43 .40
Technician 18 21.16 14.20
Paramedic 27 17.55 11.33
DTS AVOID 1.73 43 .38
Technician 18 20.94 17.44
Paramedic 27 13 96 12.99
DTS FREQ 1.12 43 .43
Technician 18 30 55 20.79
Paramedic 27 22 55 14.67
DTS INTRU .458 43 .22
Technician 18 19.05 12.18
Paramedic 27 14 18 10.26
DTS SEVER 1.24 43 .28
Technician 18 30.61 20.58
Paramedic 27 23.14 17.10
DTS TOTAL 1.20 43 .36
Technician 18 61.16 40.45
Paramedic 27 45.70 31.43
IPSAQ 1.36 40 .76
NEGINTSQ
Technician 16 2.05 .84
Paramedic 26 2.18 .68
IPSAQ NEGPERS -1.91 40 .80
Technician
Paramedic 16 5.81 3.44
26 573 3.10
IPSAQ NESITSQ 0.18 40 .79
Technician
Paramedic 16 1.74 .74
26 1.81 .72
1PSAQ POSINT 378 41 .056
Technician
Paramedic 17 7.35 2.62
26 6.23 2.10
IPSAQ POSPERS .32 41 .07
Technician
Paramedic 17 2.58 1.90
26 2.69 2.11
IPSAQ POSITSQ -1.10 41 .46
Technician
Paramedic 17 1.41 .89
26 1.64 .57
FTC! NCAS 135 42 .29
Technician 17 68.88 28.94
Paramedic 27 56.96 23.61
PTCI NW -.24 42 .35
Technician 17 33.41 10.66
Paramedic 27 32.66 7.88
PTCI SI3SQ 1.74 42 .02
Technician 17 3.41 .70
Paramedic 27 2.84 .58
PTCI TOTAL 1.14 42 .21
Technician 17 114.41 39.82
Paramedic 27 98.03 31.85
PDI CONSQ .26 48 .31
Technician 21 4.99 3.35
Paramedic 29 5.55 2.43
PD! DISQ .70 48 .66
Technician 21 4.84 3.37
Paramedic 29 4.99 2.55
PD! FRSQ .47 48 .26
Technician 21 4.62 3.20
Paramedic 29 4.90 2.34
PDI TOTAL 1.08 44 .29
Technician 19 12.21 10.00
Paramedic 27 13.70 10 71
Independent Samples (-tests for gender
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation t d.f. p
DTS AROUS
.94 43 .40
Male 39 19.69 12.70
Female 6 14.50 11.34
DTS AVOID 1.73 43 .38
Male 39 18.25 14.93
Female 6 7.00 13.76
DTS FFtEQ 1.11 43 .43
Male 39 26.89 17.68
Female 6 18 33 16.60
DTS 1NTRU
.45 43 .22
Male 39 16.43 11.56
Female 6 14.16 9.08
DTS SEVER 1.24 43 .28
Male 39 27.48 18.82
Female 6 17.33 16.83
urs TOTAL 1.20 43 .36
Male 39 54.36 35.79
Female 6 35.66 3.39
IPSAQ 1.36 40 .76
NEGINTSQ .74
Male 36 2.19 .70
Female 6 1.75
IPSAQ NEOPERS
-1.91 40 .08
Male
Female 36 5.38 3.21
6 800 2.09
1PSAQ NESITSQ
.01 ao .79
Male
Female 36 1.79 .74
6 1.78 .61
IPSAQ POSINT .37 41 .056
Male
Female 37 6.72 2.51
6 6.33 1.03.
IPSAQ POSPERS
.32 41 .07
Male
Female 37 3.29 2.22
6 3.00 .89
1PSAQ POSITSQ
-1.10 41 .46
Male
Female 37 1.50 .74
6 1.85 .50
PTCI NCAS 1.35 42 .29
Male 37 63.86 26.72
Female 6 49.42 20.14
PTCI NW
-.24 42 .35
Male 37 32.81 9.36
Female 7 33.71 6.87
PTCI SBSQ 1.74 42 .02
Male 37 3.13 .71
Female 7 2.65 .30
PTCI TOTAL 1.14 42 .21
Male 37 107.02 36.80
Female 7 90.28 26.27
PD1CONSQ
.26 48 .31
Male 43 5.36 2.94
Female 7 5.05 2.30
PD! D1SQ Male
.70 48 .66
Female 43 5.04 2.97
7 4.20 2.44
PD1FRSQ .47 48 .26
Male 43 4.86 2.79
Female 7 4.33 2.21
PD! TOTAL 1.08 44 .29
Male 40 13.72 10.62
, Female 6 8 83 7.52
